Department of Defense Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

03 October 2007

To: AL-MUSHAD, SHARIF FATHIM

Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL-MUSHAD, SHARIF FATHIM

- 1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
- 2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
- 3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

- 1. The detainee stated that while on a trip to Rome, he attended a mosque four times. The detainee stated that while at the mosque he met an individual. The detainee stated their conversation was a dialogue about daawa in general and daawa in Afghanistan. The individual explained he lived in Kabul, Afghanistan where he passed out donations to help the Afghani people and wanted to establish an international aid organization to carry out this mission. The individual invited the detainee to travel to Kabul, Afghanistan, to help him in this endeavor.
- 2. The detainee stated that in July 2001, the detainee flew from Italy to Iran. The detainee took some of his own money with him and traveled to the Afghanistan and Iran border. The detainee stated that after crossing the border, he took a taxi to a neighborhood in Kabul, Afghanistan. Arabs in the area directed the detainee to the location of the individual in the previous statement's house. The detainee stated no weapons were in the house.
- The neighborhood in the previous statement is a known center of al Qaida associated activity.
- b. Training

ISN 190 DMO Exhibit 1 Page 1 of 3

Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL-MUSHAD, SHARIF FATHIM

- 1. A source stated the detainee was a trainer at a training camp.
- A source stated he believed the detainee was a trainee at al Farouq and that the detainee was Egyptian.
- 3. A source identified the detainee as someone who graduated at al Farouq.

c. Connections/Associations

- 1. An individual stated that when he was taken to Afghanistan, in early 2000 to be interrogated by al Qaida for allegedly being a spy, the detained made the trip specifically to see him and beat him. This individual stated the detained would torture him through beatings and electric shocks. This individual stated the detained is probably not into religion, but enjoys training and warfare. This individual stated that the detained speaks fluent Italian and often tells other detaineds he is an Italian citizen.
- 2. The detainee arrived in Afghanistan, near 11 September 2001, and moved from Tora Bora, Afghanistan to Pakistan, but was arrested in Afghanistan.

d. Other Relevant Data

- 1. The detainee stated that approximately two months after the attacks by the United States, the detainee and others planned to flee Afghanistan by crossing the Iran and Afghanistan border. However, when they learned the crossing was closed, they diverted their travel to a small village outside of Jalalabad, Afghanistan, where they arrived at the beginning of Ramadan 2001 (mid November). They stayed in a house of an Afghani the entire month of Ramadan, waiting for safe passage to Pakistan. While staying in the house, they heard many planes flying over and Afghanis had told them Arabs were being hunted in the area, so the group decided to leave in an effort to reach Pakistan.
- 2. The detainee stated the group in the previous statement hired an Afghani guide who took them to a small Pakistani village. The detainee stated that after arriving in the village, the Pakistani Army detained them. The following day, the Army took them to the prison in Peshawar, Pakistan where they remained for three weeks until United States Forces transferred them to Kandahar on 1 January 2002.
- 3. An individual identified that the detainee was someone who was selling VHS tapes showing the USS Cole bombing. This individual believes that, while the detainee was working in Italy, the detainee copied information from the internet

ISN 190 DMO Exhibit 1 Page 2 of 3

Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL-MUSHAD, SHARIF FATHIM

onto tapes and sold the videos after coming to Afghanistan.

- 4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
 - a. The detainee stated his purpose for traveling to Afghanistan was to work for a charitable organization assisting the poor. The detainee denied he went to Afghanistan with the intent of fighting jihad and denied he ever trained at the al Farouq Training Camp in Afghanistan or any other training camp in Afghanistan. The detainee denied being a member of the Taliban and al Qaida, and denied fighting with the Taliban in Afghanistan.
 - b. The detainee stated he is accused of torturing someone by the Administrative Review Board; however, he was unable to do this because he was in Italy working at the time the alleged torture occurred.
 - c. The detainee stated that upon hearing of the attacks in America on the radio, the detainee and others felt sorrowful and no one was happy.
 - d. The detainee stated he plans to return to Egypt. The detainee would like to seek employment in the construction business and raise a family. The detainee stated he does not hate Americans. The detainee was asked if he had heard of a jihad against the West, and the detainee replied he had not. The detainee was asked, if directed by a cleric, would he kill infidels. The detainee responded he had never heard of anything such as that. The detainee stated he had no desire to fight Americans or ever see them again.
 - e. The detainee stated, when asked about martyrdom and blowing up market places, that he did not believe this would be under the direction of a scholar or sheikh, and Islam would not order these bombings.
 - f. The detaince did not have any affiliation with a group because he was new in Afghanistan and did not receive any training.
- 5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

ISN 190 DMO Exhibit 1 Page 3 of 3

Department of Defense Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

14 November 2007

TO:

AL-WAZAN, AHMAD ABDULLAH

SUBJECT:

UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL-WAZAN, AHMAD ABDULLAH

- 1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
- 2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
- 3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
 - a) Commitment
 - 1) The detained stated he was active in Jamat-al-Tabiligh for one year. During 1990, and on the occasion of the departure of his brother-in-law to Pakistan, the detained decided to go to Afghanistan himself and take place in the jihad. The detained and his brother-in-law proceeded to the city of Peshawar, Pakistan, traveling via Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, and Egypt. His brother-in-law was later killed by an exploding bomb while taking part in the jihad against communist forces in Afghanistan.
 - 2) The preachers of Jamat-al-Tabiligh organization have been supporting Islamic terrorist groups in south and Southeast Asia under the cover of conducting religious activities. The group is closely aligned with other Pakistani terrorist organizations and the al Qaida network.
 - 3) The detainee traveled in June 2001 with his wife and brother from Damascus, Syria on a train to Iskenderun, Turkey. From Iskenderun, the detainee traveled by train to Tehran, Iran where the detainee picked up a bus to Tayyebat, Iran. From Tayyebat, the detainee hired a taxi to the Afghanistan border. At the border, the detainee traveled in a minivan with ten to fourteen others to Herat, Afghanistan. From Herat, the detainee rented a car and driver to Jalalabad.

ISN 197 DMO Exhibit 1 Page 1 of 5

Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL-WAZAN, AHMAD ABDULLAH

- 4) A source stated an individual told him the detainee was very close to Usama bin Laden and was in charge of a camp near Kandahar and was head of the North African group of al Qaida fighters. The source stated an individual told him the detainee had his own weapon, vehicle, and guards.
- 5) The source stated the detainee also fought with the source's group near the front combat lines in the vicinity of Bagram, Afghanistan.
- 6) According to a foreign government security official, the detainee was part of a small group of Moroccan Islamic leaders who formed the Group Islamique Combatant du Maroc during 1995 in Sudan. The purpose of this organization is the overthrow of the Moroccan monarchy and to establish a religious state. The Group Islamique Combatant du Maroc was active inside Morocco, the United Kingdom, Italy, Syria, Turkey and France.
- 7) A source stated the detainee was a military leader on the front lines near Bagram, Afghanistan and also in Tora Bora, Afghanistan.
- 8) The detainee served as the director of a safe house and a camp near Jalalabad.
- 9) A source stated that the detainee was very important and was the military leader of Moroccan fighters in Afghanistan.
- b) Training
 - 1) The detained stated members of his group participated in small arms training with Kalashnikov rifles. This training was at a large complex outside of Kabul, Afghanistan and was live fire training by shooting targets. The training was for fighting against the Northern Alliance when called upon by the Taliban. In exchange, his group was provided a house in Kabul, Afghanistan.
 - 2) The detainee stated approximately eight members of his group wanted to train with weapons during the summer of 2001. In an effort to keep these members from going to one of the area training camps, the detainee obtained nine AK-47's from the Taliban in Kabul, Afghanistan. The detainee had a local official write a letter of reference and then gave a bribe to a Taliban guard at a weapons warehouse.
 - A source identified the detainee from a photograph and stated he attended training with the detainee at a training camp located near Bagram, Afghanistan.
- c) Connections/Associations

ISN 197 DMO Exhibit 1 Page 2 of 5

Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL-WAZAN, AHMAD ABDULLAH

- According to a foreign government service, the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group provided Group Islamique Combatant du Maroc recruiting, indoctrination, logistic support, and paramilitary training.
- 2) The Libyan Islamic Fighting Group emerged in 1995 among Libyans who had fought against Soviet forces in Afghanistan. Declared the government of Libyan leader Muammar Qadhafi un-Islamic and pledged to overthrow it. Some members maintain a strictly anti-Qadhafi focus and organize against Libyan Government interests, but others are aligned with Usama bin Laden's al Qaeda organization or are active in the international Mujahedin network. The group was designated for asset freeze under E.0.13224 and UNSCR 1333 in September 2001.
- 3) According to a foreign government service, Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin provided Group Islamique Combatant du Maroc paramilitary training and infrastructure support.
- 4) Gulbuddin Hikmatyar founded Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin as a faction of the Hizb I Islami party in 1977, and it was one of the major Mujahedin groups in the war against the Soviets. Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin has long-established ties with Usama bin Laden. In the early 1990s, Hikmatyar ran several terrorist training camps in Afghanistan and was a pioneer in sending mercenary fighters to other Islamic conflicts. Hikmatyar offered to shelter Usama bin Laden after the latter fled Sudan in 1996.
- 5) A source stated that in late 1996, the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group and the Morrocan Islamic Combatant Group attempted to form an alliance to share resources and personnel. In 1998, the alliance failed, leading to a rift between the two groups.
- 6) The detainee stated he and an individual went to Jalalabad, Afghanistan in early 1999 and convinced the leaders of Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin to give them a two-bedroom apartment for a Moroccan guest house.
- 7) A source stated the detainee was always in contact with Usama bin Laden and when the detainee gave an order; it was the same as Usama bin Laden giving the order himself.
- d) Other Relevant Data
 - The detainee stated he was called the Military Commander of Jamat Mujahadeen Maroc, only due to him being bestowed a title by default and because he was one of the oldest of the group.
 - 2) A source identified the detainee from a photograph and stated he was an individual that was experienced with explosives and improvised explosive devices.

ISN 197 DMO Exhibit 1 Page 3 of 5

Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL-WAZAN, AHMAD ABDULLAH

- 3) The detainee stated his name was wrong in his file but the name the detainee gave was already listed as his current name.
- 4) Ahmad Abdullah Al-Wazan was the name the detainee used with Pakistani authorities, but is actually the name of his dead brother-in-law.
- 5) A source identified the detainee as Moroccan/"Big Commander" for Usama bin Laden and recognized the detainee from either al Farouq or Tora Bora.
- 6) The al Farouq Training Camp in Afghanistan was funded by al Qaida and was more advanced than other training camps in Afghanistan. The training at al Farouq consists of two week periods of weapons training, a basic commando course, topography, and explosives.
- 7) A source stated he received electronic detonation training from the detainee at a guest house in Jalalabad in 2001.
- 8) A source stated he saw the detained at a guest house in Kabul, Afghanistan and heard the detained was a leader at the al Farouq training camp.
- 9) A source identified the detainee as the Commander of al Farouq and four to five other training camps.
- 10) A source stated the detainee was a camp commander during his training at a camp in the Derunta region near Jalalabad, Afghanistan.
- 11) The detainee provided explosives training to a convicted terrorist.
- 4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
 - a) The detained denied any knowledge of the 9/11 attacks in the United States prior to their execution and didn't have knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or United States interests.
 - b) The detainee stated he had no connection to Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group.
 - c) The detainee adamantly denies any knowledge of or affiliation with al Qaida or Taliban members while in Afghanistan. The detainee also denies visiting the al Farouq training camp in Afghanistan or the Ashara guest house in Jalalabad.

ISN 197 DMO Exhibit 1 Page 4 of 5

Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL-WAZAN, AHMAD ABDULLAH

- d) The detainee said he had no involvement with al Qaida and would never swear bayaat to Usama bin Laden.
- e) The detained stated he holds no ill will towards America, even after four years, this is just a path Allah has chosen for him.
- 5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

ISN 197 DMO Exhibit 1 Page 5 of 5

Department of Defense Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

7 February 2007.

To:

BEN ATIF, MAHMUD OMAR

SUBJECT:

UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF BEN ATIF, MAHMUD OMAR

- 1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
- 2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
- 3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

- 1. The detainee was recruited at the local mosque called the al-Shinqity Mosque in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. The detainee was also influenced by everyday events, videos about jihad, and people talking. The detainee stated that the thought was in his head.
- 2. The detainee was identified by a source as having been recruited to be a Mujahedin from Mecca, Saudi Arabia. The detainee was recruited from the Jamat-al-Tabiligh organization.
- 3. The detainee traveled from Jeddah, Saudi Arabia to Bahrain and from there he traveled to Karachi, Pakistan. Once in Karachi, the detainee traveled by bus to Quetta, Pakistan and then to Afghanistan until he arrived at a guest house.
 - 4. The detainee funded the trip to Afghanistan with his own funds.
- 5. After training at al Farouq Training Camp, the detainee proceeded to the front lines in Khvajch Ghar, Afghanistan, where he was told he would fight with the Taliban against the Northern Alliance.
- 6. A source identified the detainee as carrying a rocket propelled grenade and was a member of the Taiha unit at Khvajeh Ghar, Afghanistan.

DMO Exhibit 1 Page 1 of 3

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF BEN ATIF, MAHMUD OMAR

- 7. Even though the detainee is an Arab he considered himself a Taliban because he fought for them and along side them.
 - 8. The detainee stated that his enemies were the Northern Alliance.
- 9. The detainee has been identified as being seen on the frontlines at Khvajeh Ghar, Afghanistan and Mazar-e-Sharif, Afghanistan.
- 10. The detainee fought on the front lines in Konduz, Afghanistan under a senior al Qaida leader until his capture in December 2001.

b. Training

While at all Farouq Training Camp the detained received training in how to use light weapons, Kalashnikov, rocket-propelled granades, and pistols. That training lasted about three weeks.

c. Other Relevant Data

- 1. During the detainee's time at al Farouq, around July 2001, Usama bin Laden visited and gave a speech about the behavior of Mohammed's followers.
 - 2. The detainee was present at the al Janki uprising at Mazar-e-Sharif, Afghanistan.
- 4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
- a. The detainee stated he never trained with explosives, chemicals, biological agents or nuclear material.
- b. The detainee never got paid. However, one time when the detainee was on the Konduz line in Afghanistan money came in. One of the detainee's co-workers passed out two thousand rupees, but the detainee gave it away to charity.
- c. The detainee was asked to take an oath to Usama bin Laden but he did not take one since he might have been obligated to do things that he might not want to do.
 - d. The detainee was never screened for or asked to participate in a martyrdom mission.
 - e. The detainee stated he has never shot at or killed anyone.
- f. The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on 11 September 2001, and also denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or United States interests.
- 5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting

Page 2 of 3

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF BEN ATIF, MAHMUD OMAR

Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

Page 3 of 3

Department of Defense Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

10 July 2007

TO:

KHALID ADULLAH MIJSH'AD AL-MUTAYRI

SUBJECT:

UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE

REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF KHALID ADULLAH MIJSH'AD

AL-MUTAYRI

- 1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
- 2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
- 3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

- 1. The detained stated he traveled with 15,000 United States Dollars from Kuwait to Afghanistan via Iran on 21 or 22 September 2001.
- 2. The detainee stated he gave 9,000 United States Dollars to an Afghan man to construct a mosque.
- 3. The detainee stated he visited the al Wafa office in Kabul, Afghanistan and agreed to donate 1,000 United States Dollars to al Wafa.
- 4. Al Wafa is on the United States Government's Terrorist Exclusion List, which includes organizations that provide material support to further terrorist activity.
- 5. An individual stated the detaince came to Afghanistan after 11 September 2001 for jihad and the detaince arrived in Afghanistan with a list of all Kuwaitis in Afghanistan for jihad.

b. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee's name and contact information appears on a document containing information regarding the capture of Taliban and al Qaida fighters.

DMO Exhibit 1 Page 1 of 3

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF KHALID ADULLAH MIJSH'AD ALMUTAYRI

- 2. The detainee's name is on a list of Arabs incarcerated in Pakistan which was recovered in a suspected al Qaida safe house in Islamabad, Pakistan. The list appears to have been created between March 2001 and January 2002.
- 3. The detainee's name and safety deposit box number are on a list recovered on 11 September 2002 from an alleged al Qaida residence in Karachi, Pakistan. The list indicates the detainee's passport was in his safety deposit box.
- 4. The detainee's name and phone number are on a list of captured Mujahedin found on a hard drive associated with a senior al Qaida operative which was seized in March 2003 in Pakistan.
- 5. The detainee's name and alias are on a list of 324 names recovered from safe house raids associated with suspected al Qaida in Karachi, Pakistan.
- 6. The detainee's name is on a chart prepared by Kuwaiti state security depicting the relationship between al Qaida and extremist groups in Kuwait.
 - c. Training
 - 1. An individual stated the detained received training with Lashkar-e-Tayyiba.
 - 2. Lashkar-e-Tayyiba has been designated a foreign terrorist organization.
- 4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
 - a. The detainee stated he thought al Wafa was a legitimate charity.
- b. The detainee stated he did not know the money provided to al Wafa was used to support the al Qaida network.
- c. The detainee stated he has never received any military training, carried a weapon, or participated in combat.
 - d. The detainee denied any prior knowledge of the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks.
- e. The detainee stated he first heard of al Qaida when he was imprisoned and does not know anyone affiliated with the organization.
- f. The detainee stated he does not consider the United States an enemy, he has no intention to take up arms or participate in any terrorist activity, and he intends to return to Kuwait to find employment if he is released from United States custody.

DMO Exhibit 1 Page 2 of 3

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF KHALID ADULLAH MIJSH'AD AL-MUTAYRI

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

DMO Exhibit 1 Page 3 of 3

Department of Defense Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

12 February 2007

TO:

AL KUNDUZI, UMAR ABDULLAH

SUBJECT:

UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL KUNDUZI, UMAR ABDULLAH

- 1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
- 2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
- 3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
 - a. Commitment
- 1. The detainee stated he traveled to Afghanistan from his home in Saudi Arabia a few weeks after the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001.
- 2. The detainee's travel route was from Jeddah, Saudi Arabia to Bahrain. The detainee flew from Bahrain to Doha, Qatar and from Qatar he flew to Karachi, Pakistan.
 - 3. A source identified the detainee fighting for the Taliban against the Northern Alliance.
- 4. The detainee left Jalalabad, Afghanistan and traveled to Tora Bora, Afghanistan after Jalalabad fell to the Northern Alliance. The detainee sought refuge in a cave with five other Arabs for approximately one month; everyone in the cave was armed with a Kalashnikov rifle.
- 5. The detainee stated the order to leave the cave came approximately ten days after the start of American bombing. The detainee also stated some people left their weapons behind as they were fleeing Tora Bora, Afghanistan. The detainee chose to carry his weapon, along with three additional magazines.

DMO Exhibit 1 Page 1 of 3

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL KUNDUZI, UMAR ABDULLAH

- 6. A source stated the detainee was in Afghanistan since 1997 fighting with the Taliban and Arab fighters aligned with Usama bin Laden. The source also stated the detainee openly admitted to being part of a group that would torture suspected spies among them.
- 7. A source stated the detainee would travel to Saudi Arabia on average once every three months and return with new recruits and about 4,000 United States dollars.
- 8. A source stated the detainee was part of one of the last groups that retreated to a cave in the Tora Bora Mountains in late 2001 after the United States began bombing. The source also stated the detainee carried a rocket propelled grenade launcher and the detainee was an expert in mortars and as such was responsible for preparing mortars.

b. Connections/Associations

The detainee escaped Tora Bora, Afghanistan with the Khalden Training Camp leader who is directly linked to several other senior al Qaida operatives, including Usama bin Laden.

c. Intent

The detainee expressed a desire to kill a Military Police guard and also stated he really wanted to be let free so he could kill Americans.

- 4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
- a. When the detainee was questioned about the names and phone numbers of al Qaida in his possession during capture he stated the reason he had the names and phone numbers of al Qaida members was because they were his brothers and friends, not because they were al Qaida.
- b. The detainee stated he never fought with the Taliban or al Qaida, and no one attempted to actively recruit him during his travels from Saudi Arabia to Pakistan.
- c. The detainee denies any knowledge of or association with the Taliban, al Qaida or any terrorist organization.
 - d. The detainee stated he did not go to Afghanistan to fight, but instead to visit his family.
 - e. The detainee stated he does not look up to Usama bin Laden.

DMO Exhibit 1 Page 2 of 3

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL KUNDUZI, UMAR ABDULLAH

- f. The detainee stated he has an uncle who is a friend of General Dostum and is a supporter of the Northern Alliance.
- g. The detainee stated if he were released he would simply return home and would not harm anyone unless they were the aggressor.
- 5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

DMO Exhibit 1 Page 3 of 3

Department of Defense Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

07 September 2007

To: SULAYMAN, ABD AL RAHMAN ABDU ABU AL GHAYTH

Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF SULAYMAN, ABD AL RAHMAN ABDU ABU AL GHAYTH

- An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
- 2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
- 3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

- The detainee stated he was recruited to travel to Afghanistan to search for a wife and a
 job. The detainee was told that if he traveled to Afghanistan, he would be able to find a
 bride and the Taliban would provide him with a house. The recruiter also mentioned the
 jihad in Afghanistan.
- 2. According to the detainee, the recruiter was receiving money from the Taliban.
- 3. The recruiter arranged for the detained to travel to Afghanistan by airplane via Karachi, Pakistan. He also gave the detained 100 United States dollars.
- 4. The detainee departed Yemen during March 2001. The detainee traveled from Yemen to Dubai, United Arab Emirates and then went to Karachi, Pakistan. From Karachi, Pakistan, the detainee proceeded to Quetta, Pakistan where he went to the Daftar Taliban to join the Taliban.
- 5. The Daftare Taliban Office located in Quetta, Pakistan, helped Arabs cross the boarder into Afghanistan by coordination travel and lodging for a fee. The Taliban office advised Arabs to stay at houses in Kabul and Kandahar, Afghanistan during travel.

ISN 223 DMO Exhibit 1 Page 1 of 4

Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF SULAYMAN, ABD AL RAHMAN ABDU ABU AL GHAYTH

- 6. Once in Kandahar, Afghanistan, the detainee was directed to travel to Kabul, Afghanistan to find a house. The detainee was told to go to the al Qaeity house.
- 7. The detainee went to and remained at the al Qaeity house for at least eight months.
- 8. The Hamza Qaiti guest house was identified as a safe house for Saudi Arabian and Yemeni al Qaida members that was owned and operated by al Qaida.
- 9. The detained stated he traveled to the front lines twice during his time in Kabul, Afghanistan. The first trip was approximately two months after arriving at the guest house and the second was approximately six months later. The detained stated he didn't have his own weapon, so he borrowed an AK-47.

b. Training

- The detainee stated he became familiar with the Kalashnikov in Yemen where he did some target practice.
- 2. The detained claimed to have received no formal training at any camp, but was instead trained by an individual in Kabul, Afghanistan. The detained was trained on the use of the PK machine gun and 82 millimeter mortar.
- 3. A source identified the detainee as someone who was at Tarnak Farms in January 2000.
- 4. Tarnak Farms facility in Afghanistan housed an al Qaida poison and explosive training laboratory and an advanced operational training camp. No one was allowed to train at Tarnak without first passing through basic training at al Farouq camp.
- 5. Indications are that the detained trained at all Farouq and that, because he has artillery experience, and that he also trained at Markez Khalid.
- 6. The al Farouq training camp in Afghanistan was funded by al Qaida and was more advanced than other training camps in Afghanistan. The training at al Farouq consists of two week periods of weapons training, a basic commando course, topography, and explosives.

c. Connections/Associations

 The detainee was reported to have been seen with Usama bin Laden in the Tora Bora, Afghanistan region.

> DMO Exhibit 1 Page 2 of 4

Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF SULAYMAN, ABD AL RAHMAN ABDU ABU AL GHAYTH

- 2. The detainee has been identified as an al Qaida spokesman in Usama bin Laden's entourage.
- 3. The detainee's name was found on computer equipment that was confiscated during a raid on an alleged al Qaida residence in Pakistan.
- 4. The detainee's name was found on computer equipment that was connected with an all Qaida operative. The file listed the names of captured Mujahedin.

d. Other Relevant Data

- The detainee withdrew from his position at the front line on 12 November 2001 due to a large attack from the Northern Alliance.
- 2. The detainee decided to leave Kabul, Afghanistan for good around December 2001.
- 3. The detainee stated that when Massoud attacked the front lines, the detainee was given a Kalashnikov and he and 11 individuals withdrew to the mountains. The group stayed in the mountains near the Pakistan border for one month. A local commander directed the group to areas where food and water were stored. The detainee stated his group was turned in to the police by villagers the day after they entered Pakistan.
- 4. An individual identified the detainee as the interrogator that tortured him while the Taliban imprisoned him in Afghanistan.
- 4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
 - a. The detainee stated he had no connection with Usama bin Laden, al Qaeda, or the Taliban.
 - b. The detainee has denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on 11 September 2001.
 - c. The detainee has denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or Unites States interests.
 - d. The detainee denied any knowledge or planning of internal uprisings at the Guantanamo Bay detention facility.
 - e. The detainee denied receiving any other military training in Afghanistan, to include visiting al Farouq Training Camp.

DMO Exhibit 1 Page 3 of 4

Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF SULAYMAN, ABD AL RAHMAN ABDU ABU AL GHAYTH

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

DMO Exhibit 1 Page 4 of 4

Department of Defense Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

16 March 2007

TO:

ABD AL RAHMAN ABDULLAH ALI MUHAMMAD

SUBJECT:

UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ABD AL RAHMAN ABDULLAH ALI MUHAMMAD

- 1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
- 2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
- 3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
 - a. Commitment
- 1. The detainee stated he heard from a man in his village that Arabs were welcomed and Koranic teachers were needed in Pakistan.
- 2. The detainee borrowed 40,000 Yemeni riyals from a man who owned several businesses in Yemen.
 - 3. The detainee had also saved 45,000 Yemeni riyals of his own from the sale of ghat.
- 4. The detainee purchased round trip tickets to Karachi, Pakistan for approximately 45,000 Yemeni riyals.
- 5. The detainee spent three months in Karachi, Pakistan looking for work. The detainee stayed with a Yemeni friend whom he had known for two years.
- 6. The detainee stated he went to Quetta, Pakistan in July or August 2001, and went to the Taliban center to find work in Afghanistan. The detainee was told there was no work to be found in Afghanistan. Two days later the detainee returned to Karachi, Pakistan where he stayed for approximately 20 days.
- 7. The detainee returned to the Taliban office in Quetta, Pakistan and paid 1200 riyals for a guide, who took him to Kandahar, Afghanistan to find work.

DMO Exhibit 1 Page 1 of 4

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ABD AL RAHMAN ABDULLAH ALI MUHAMMAD

- 8. While in Kandahar, Afghanistan, the detainee stayed at a Madrasa for ten days. At the end of the ten days, the detainee heard of the New York events and decided to attempt to get out of the country. The people at the Madrasa agreed to help him flee, but not before sending him to a known Taliban house 10 to 15 minutes west of Kabul, Afghanistan.
- 9. The detainee stated, while in Kabul, Afghanistan, he stayed in a Taliban house run by an Afghan individual.
- 10. The Afghan individual was a Taliban commander in charge of a camp situated between the cities of Kabul and Bagram, Afghanistan that trained and housed Taliban soldiers who fought on the Bagram line.

b. Training

The detainee claimed he had no military experience, but had fired a Kalashnikov rifle in Yemen.

c. Connections/Associations

- 1. The detainee's name was found on a document listing 324 Arabic names, aliases and nationalities recovered during a raid on a suspected al Qaida safe house. According to the document, the detainee was in possession of a Saudi passport, ticket and identification cards.
 - 2. In 2002, the detainee was identified as a member of al Qaida.
- 3. The detainee's name is on a letter listing 68 probable al Qaida members incarcerated in Pakistan. The undated handwritten letter was recovered along with materials linked to al Qaida by allied personnel. The letter provided a list of names of incarcerated Arabs, aliases, countries of origin and the letter encourages the correspondent to incite the people against the Pakistan government.
- 4. On 14 December 2001, Pakistan authorities captured 84 Mujahedin fighters fleeing Afghanistan. The detainee's name, country and family telephone number were listed on a document published on the internet in July 2002. The document contained information regarding the capture of these Taliban and al Qaida fighters who had crossed the border in Nangarhar province, Afghanistan.

DMO Exhibit 1 Page 2 of 4

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ABD AL RAHMAN ABDULLAH ALI MUHAMMAD

- 5. The detainee's name was found on the hard drive of a computer seized from the suspected al Qaida cell that attacked United States forces in October 2002. The computer contained an extensive Arabic language manual that appeared to outline how to case and attack buildings, vehicles and personnel. A sub-directory contained a handwritten Arabic explosives manual.
- 6. The detainee's name was found on a computer file that lists contact points and telephone numbers for al Qaida Mujahedin in Pakistan. The file was recovered from computer media seized during raids against al Qaida associated safe houses in Pakistan on 1 March 2003.
- 7. The detainee's name and alias were listed in a document found on a floppy disc recovered from a raid of a suspected al Qaida safe house on 11 September 2002. The document lists the detainee's safety deposit box number and contents, which included a passport, ticket and identifications.
- 8. The detainee's father is a member of Jamat al Tabiligh. One of his father's friends is also a member of Jamat al Tabiligh and helped the detainee travel to Pakistan by lending him money.
 - 9. A source identified the detainee as a member of Jamat al Tabiligh.
- 10. Many al Qaida operatives joined Jamat al Tabiligh in order to travel under the guise of Islamic missionaries.
- 4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
- a. The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on 11 September 2001. The detainee also denied having any knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or United States interests.
- b. The detainee denied receiving any weapons during his one month stay in Kabul, Afghanistan.
- c. The detainee stated he was not a member of al Qaida and no people should be hurt in the name of religion.
- d. The detainee denied going to Afghanistan to participate in jihad. The purpose of his travel was to obtain employment teaching the Koran.

DMO Exhibit 1 Page 3 of 4

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ABD AL RAHMAN ABDULLAH ALI MUHAMMAD

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

DMO Exhibit 1 Page 4 of 4

Department of Defense Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

27 February 2007

To:

AL AWDA, FOWZI KHALID ABDULLAH

SUBJECT:

UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF FOWZI KHALID ABDULLAH AL AWDA

- 1. (U) An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
- 2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
- 3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

- 1. The detainee left home to travel to Afghanistan for two months. The detainee brought approximately 4,000 United States Dollars, 4,000 Saudi Riyals and 400 German Deutschmarks with him.
- 2. The detainee traveled first to Dubai, United Arab Emirates. The detainee then traveled from Dubai to Karachi, Pakistan, and then on to Quetta, Pakistan. Once the detainee reached Quetta, he traveled across the Afghanistan border to Buldak.
- 3. In Buldak, Afghanistan, the detainee asked a Sheikh at a mosque to contact someone from the Taliban to assist the detainee in traveling to places to teach in Afghanistan. The Taliban official drove the detainee to Kandahar, Afghanistan, and then to Logar, Afghanistan.
- 4. The detainee traveled to Afghanistan under the auspices of providing monetary relief and to teach the Koran to affected Afghanis. The detainee was eventually captured by Pakistani border troops without documents during the detainee's attempt to escape from Afghanistan.

b. Training

1. A Taliban official took the detainee to a small camp located one hour outside of Kandahar, Afghanistan, where the detainee fired a Kalashinikov rifle at targets.

DMO Exhibit 1 Page 1 of 3

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF FOWZI KHALID ABDULLAH AL AWDA

- 2. The detainee stated he fired a Kalashnikov rifle a few times but never received training in the use of the weapon.
 - c. Connections/Associations
- 1. The detainee traveled in a group of twelve to the mountains and stated the group may have had some al Qaida or Taliban members.
- 2. The detainee's name was found on a computer file that lists contact points and telephone numbers for al Qaida Mujahedin in Pakistan.
- 3. The detainee's name was found on a computer file used by suspected al Qaida members that contained a list of 78 associates incarcerated in Pakistan. Allied personnel found the information in a suspected al Qaida safe house in Islamabad, Pakistan.
- 4. The detainee stated he knew one Taliban member, an Arab from either Yemen or Saudi Arabia, who took the detainee to Arabic schools so the detainee could teach the Koran.
 - d. Other Relevant Data
- 1. The detainee stayed in Jalalabad, Afghanistan in a house with three Arabs who appeared to be fighters and carried Kalashnikovs.
- 2. After about two weeks in Jalalabad, Afghanistan, one of the Arabs who appeared to be a fighter gave the detainee a Kalashnikov. The detainee departed with a large group trying to make it through the Tora Bora Mountains to Pakistan.
 - 3. The detainee laid his Kalashnikov down as he surrendered to Pakistani border guards.
- 4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
 - a. The detainee stated he is not a member of the Taliban or al Qaida.
- b. The detainee reiterated that he just wanted to go to Afghanistan for three weeks to teach, give money to the poor and get back to his job with the Kuwaiti government.
- c. The detainee denied going to Afghanistan to fight the jihad and stated there were Muslims on both sides of the fight and the detainee could not kill Muslims.
 - d. The detainee stated that he was not a soldier and has had no formal military training.

DMO Exhibit 1 Page 2 of 3

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF FOWZI KHALID ABDULLAH AL AWDA

- e. The detainee denied attending any training camps and stated he never fought with or knew anyone belonging to al Qaida.
- f. The detainee stated he is not aware of any potential upcoming attacks against the United States or Western interests.
- g. The detainee is not aware of potential al Qaida plans to reconstitute past terrorist plots to carry out attacks on specific targets.
- 5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

DMO Exhibit 1 Page 3 of 3

Department of Defense Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

17 April 2007

TO:

ABD AL RAZAQ MUHAMMED SALIH

SUBJECT:

UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ABD AL RAZAQ MUHAMMED SALIH

- 1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
- 2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
- 3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
 - a. Commitment
- 1. The detainee traveled to Afghanistan prior to 11 September 2001 via Dubai, United Arab Emirates and Karachi, Pakistan.
- 2. The detainee stated he felt compelled to go to Afghanistan to teach the Koran to the Afghans. The detainee stated he was not formally trained in the Koran, but wanted to recite what he could.
- 3. The detainee traveled to Afghanistan with a falsified passport issued in Taiz, Yemen in 2001.
- 4. The detainee was identified as a jihadist that worked at the Talut Center in Tora Bora, Afghanistan. The detainee carried or operated a Bika weapon.
 - b. Training
- 1. The detainee was identified as having trained at al Farouq Training Camp in Afghanistan between late July and mid September 2001.
- 2. Al Qaida basic training at al Farouq Military Camp trained all non-Afghans to fight for the Taliban as well as other jihads. The training encompassed eight to ten weeks of intense instruction covering weapons familiarization, commando tactics, topography, and explosives.

DMO Exhibit 1 Page 1 of 3

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ABD AL RAZAQ MUHAMMED SALIH

- 3. An individual stated he trained with the detainee at al Farouq Training Camp. After the detainee completed training, he went to Bagram, Afghanistan. The individual saw the detainee again in the Tora Bora region of Afghanistan.
 - c. Connections/Associations
 - 1. The detainee was identified as Qa'Qa al Yemini.
 - 2. The name Qa'Qa al Yemini was found on a set of al Qaida training camp applications.
- 3. The detainee's name and other information were found on a document listing over 300 Arabic names, aliases and nationalities. The document was recovered from safe house raids associated with suspected al Qaida in Karachi, Pakistan.
- 4. A source stated he and the detainee traveled to Kandahar, Afghanistan where they stayed in an unknown Taliban guest house.
 - d. Other Relevant Data
- 1. The detainee crossed the Pakistan border where he turned himself over to the Pakistan forces.
 - The detained was transferred into United States custody on 2 January 2002.
- 4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
- a. The detainee stated he doesn't like violence and was not fighting in Afghanistan, but was seeking a job teaching in a mosque.
- b. The detainee stated a Sheikh said it was forbidden to fight for the Taliban so the detainee never had a weapon and never joined in the fighting. The detainee stated he wasn't brave enough to carry a weapon or fight.
- c. The detainee denied any al Qaida or Taliban connection and claimed never to have seen Usama bin Laden.
- d. The detainee denied having any knowledge relating to the conflict in Afghanistan, the Taliban, or any terrorist organizations.
- e. The detained denied having knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on 11 September 2001, and also denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or United States interests.

DMO Exhibit 1 Page 2 of 3

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ABD AL RAZAQ MUHAMMED SALIH

f. The detainee stated that if released, he would like to return to his place of birth, located in Haja, Yemen and would return to his family's farm.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

DMO Exhibit 1 Page 3 of 3

Department of Defense Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

22 August 2007

To: JARABH, SAEED AHMED MOHAMMED ABDULLAH SAREM

Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF JARABH, SAEED AHMED MOHAMMED ABDULLAH SAREM

- 1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
- 2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
- 3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
 - a. Commitment
 - 1. The detainee was a Yemeni member of al Qaida.
 - A source stated the detainee was a member of al Qaida and will go back to jihad when he leaves Guantanamo.
 - 3. The detainee stated that in 1992 he re-discovered religion and became interested in joining the jihad in Chechnya or Kashmir. To pay for expenses, the detainee helped himself to the cash box at his father's jewelry store. The detainee had consulted his father regarding jihad and was told no.
 - 4. In May 2002, the detainee stated he had traveled to Afghanistan twice. The first trip was in late 2000 where he claimed that he worked with three separate Islamic charities. The second trip was in September or August of 2001.
 - 5. The detainee stated he traveled to Afghanistan because he intended to go to the Chechen border to help refugees.
 - 6. The detained cited the Koran and the possibility of expanding his gold business as motivation for travel to Afghanistan. The detained made his own travel

DMO Exhibit 1 Page 1 of 4

Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF JARABH, SAEED AHMED MOHAMMED ABDULLAH SAREM

arrangements.

- 7. The detainee stated he stayed at a guest house for Chechen jihadists under the command of an individual.
- 8. The individual in the previous statement is an established Yemeni al Qaida figure.
- 9. A source stated the detainee was a suicide bomber who had sworn Bayat (an oath of allegiance) to Usama bin Laden.
- 10. A source stated the detainee was a fighter on the front lines against the Northern Alliance.
- 11. A source stated the detainee was a machine gunner at Tora Bora, Afghanistan.
- 12. A source stated the detainee was at al Farouq and Tora Bora, Afghanistan.

b. Training

- 1. A source stated the detainee attended training at al Farouq, Afghanistan.
- 2. A source identified the detainee as being at al Farouq Camp in Afghanistan. The source stated the detainee received full training to include Arms Training with pistol, Kalashnikov, hand grenades, and Bika, a 25 KM march, Fighting Techniques, and Explosives.
- 3. The detainee stated he attended light arms training at Abu Ubaida Camp, also known as Tarnak Farms, at Kandahar airport, Afghanistan.
- 4. Tarnak Farms was considered the most important al Qaida training facility in Afghanistan since it was where al Qaida operatives received advanced training including urban assault and other tactics. A prerequisite to attending Tarnak Farms was completion of basic training at al Farouq training camp.

c. Connections/Associations

- 1. The detainee stated he traveled to Kandahar, Afghanistan to meet up with an established Yemeni al Qaida member.
- 2. The detainee stated he was in the company of a person whom the detainee believed to be al Qaida.

DMO Exhibit 1 Page 2 of 4

Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF JARABH, SAEED AHMED MOHAMMED ABDULLAH SAREM

- 3. A senior al Qaida Lieutenant identified the detainee as a Yemeni whom he knew from Afghanistan.
- 4. The detainee's name is on a list of items found during a raid of a suspected al Qaida guest house.

d. Other Relevant Data

- 1. The detainee stated he stayed with an individual in Jalalabad, Afghanistan for one week. When Kabul fell, the detainee and the individual traveled six hours to the individual's village house where they stayed for one month. The detainee wanted to go to the Yemeni Embassy in Islamabad, Pakistan, so he and the individual, on about 17 November, left on foot five or six days through the mountains to a place called Sheltar, approximately 200 meters from Pakistan border.
- 2. The detainee stated he was arrested at a border checkpoint.
- The detainee had been identified as the owner of a Casio F-91W wristwatch. This
 model has been used in bombings that have been linked to al Qaida and radical
 Islamic terrorist improvised explosive devices.
- 4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
 - a. The detainee stated all of the information he provided when he was initially captured were lies and his interrogators made him provide that information.
 - b. The detainee stated that if he was released, he would like to return to Sanaa, Yemen and pursue a career in livestock or as a jewelry trader.
 - c. The detainee stated he believes the attacks of September 11th were wrong, and that Usama bin Laden and al Qaida are not adhering to the true Islamic faith. The detainee stressed the only reason he traveled to Afghanistan in the first place, was to teach the Koran. Once the detainee learned people from Abu Obaida were instructing others on how to fire a Kalashnikov, he thought it would be very interesting to learn. The detainee explained it is a duty for a Muslim to be knowledgeable regarding how to defend one's self, and consequently, he considered the training to be a good opportunity.
- 5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against

DMO Exhibit 1

Page 3 of 4

Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF JARABH, SAEED AHMED MOHAMMED ABDULLAH SAREM

continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

DMO Exhibit 1 Page 4 of 4

Department of Defense Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

9 April 2007

TO:

NABIL HADJARAB

SUBJECT:

UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE

REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF NABIL HADJARAB

- 1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
- 2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
- 3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

- 1. The detainee sought and purchased a French passport in the Barbesse District of Paris, France for approximately 300 French Francs. The detainee stated it was common knowledge one could find a passport for purchase there.
- 2. The detainee stated he traveled to the United Kingdom from Paris, France, at the end of November 2000. The detainee stayed at the Finsbury Park Mosque in London, England for a week.
- 3. The detainee stated he met an individual who suggested the detainee consider going to Afghanistan as it was a true Islamic country. This individual said he could send the detainee to Afghanistan to study, without costing the detainee anything. The detainee stated he found the individual's offer very attractive.
- 4. The detainee stated he flew with another person to Islamabad, Pakistan and arrived on 27 March 2001. The detainee and this other person called a contact number provided by the individual upon their arrival. An Afghan picked them up and took them to a hotel. From the hotel, the detainee traveled to Jalalabad, Afghanistan.
- 5. The detainee stated in November 2001, there was noise and panic in the neighborhood. The detainee was told the Afghan Army was coming to kill Arabs and they needed to leave. The detainee left Jalalabad, Afghanistan, with others in a taxi heading to Pakistan. They took the taxi

DMO Exhibit 1 Page 1 of 3

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF NABIL HADJARAB

as far as they could and then rode in a pick-up truck with other Arabs. It was dark but the detainee knew he was in the mountains somewhere near a small village.

- 6. The detainee stated he stayed in the village for four or five days, then joined a group of eight others and went further up into the mountains. The group reached an area with trenches and stopped. The detainee shared a trench with the group for approximately 20 to 25 days. The trench was equipped with one AK-47 assault rifle and a few hand grenades.
- 7. The detainee stated around 16 December 2001, his group began their move toward the Pakistan border. During the movement, under the cover of darkness, the group was attacked by helicopters. The detainee was wounded in the attack and made his way to a village in Afghanistan. The detainee surrendered to armed Afghans on the outskirts of the village.

b. Training

The detainee stated he was trained how to use the AK-47 assault rifle.

c. Connections/Associations

- 1. The detainee primarily attended three mosques in London, England; Finsbury Park, Baker Street, and Stamfort Hill. Finsbury Park was the mosque he attended most often for both prayers and lectures.
- 2. The Baker Street Mosque was used for recruitment of young Muslims. The Baker Street Mosque was the home of the radical Imam, Abu Qatada al Filistini. The Imam, Abu Qatada al Filistini, was al Qaida's spiritual leader in Europe.
- 3. The Finsbury Park Mosque was previously associated with an Islamic fundamentalist gathering in which a number of senior Muslim leaders gave presentations praising Usama bin Laden and justifying the 11 September 2001 attacks on the United States.
- 4. Sheikh Abu Hamza, the spiritual leader of Finsbury Park Mosque, facilitated travel to Afghanistan and access to Usama bin Laden training commanders.
- 5. The detainee was identified as the London, England, associate of an individual who is implicated in a plot to detonate an improvised radiological device in the United States.
- 4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
- a. The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on 11 September 2001, and also denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or United States interests.

DMO Exhibit 1 Page 2 of 3

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF NABIL HADJARAB

- b. The detainee stated he did not know Afghanistan was a haven for terrorists.
- c. The detainee stated he is truly sorry about what happened on 11 September 2001. The detainee stated from the beginning he has been sincere with investigators and has told everything.
- d. The detainee stated he went to Afghanistan to study and at the time he was arrested, he was a student.
- e. The detainee stated he did not know any al Qaida members and no person visiting the house in Jalalabad, Afghanistan, indicated they were with al Qaida.
- 5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

DMO Exhibit 1 Page 3 of 3

Department of Defense Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

27 January 2007

TO:

YAHIA, ABDULLAH Y

SUBJECT:

UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF YAHIA, ABDULLAH Y

- 1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
- 2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
- 3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
 - a. Commitment
- The detainee met a Mujahedin fighter who financed the detainee's travels to the al Farouq Training Camp in Afghanistan.
 - 2. The detainee was given a false Yemeni passport for use in getting into Afghanistan.
 - 3. In August 2001, the detainee traveled to Herat, Afghanistan through Iran.
- 4. The detainee went to Kandahar, Afghanistan and stayed in a safe house for one week before departing for the al Farouq Training Camp.
- 5. After leaving the al Farouq Training Camp, the detainee traveled to Kabul, Afghanistan and alternated staying at two safe houses. The detainee then went to the Malek Center.
- 6. When the bombing of Kabul, Afghanistan began, the detainee moved closer to the Pakistan border so as to escape from Afghanistan and then return home to Iran.
- 7. When the detainee arrived in Jalalabad, Afghanistan, he stayed at a safe house outside of the city. The detainee remained there approximately three weeks.
- 8. When the bombing of Jalalabad, Afghanistan began, the detained traveled towards the Pakistan border in a convoy.

DMO Exhibit 1 Page 1 of 2

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF YAHLA, ABDULLAH Y

- 9. The detainee's group came under attack as they exited the mountains. The bombing continued and prevented the detainee from re-entering the mountains.
- 10. The detainee met people who took a small group to a stable and later into their house. One evening, Afghan authorities arrived at the house and took the fighters into custody.

b. Training

- 1. The detainee admits he received weapons training at the al Farouq Training Camp. The detainee received training on the Kalashnikov rifle, the rocket-propelled grenade launcher, and the Simonov. The 11 September 2001 attacks on the United States occurred during the detainee's first week in training. The detainee became ill and stopped training.
- 2. The detainee received approximately one month of anti-aircraft artillery and rocket-propelled grenade launcher training while at the Malek Center.

c. Connections/Associations

- 1. The detainee's name was among the 324 names listed on a document recovered from a safe house raid associated with suspected al Qaida in Karachi, Pakistan.
 - 2. The detainee claims he had seen Usama Bin Ladin in the Tora Bora mountains.
- 3. The detainee was identified as being in Tora Bora after he received training at the al Farouq Training Camp.
- 4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
- a. The detainee reports he had no intention to fight the Northern Alliance or the United States. There is no reason for the detainee to fight the United States since Yemen and the United States have good relations. The detainee is willing to tell the authorities if he hears anything about an uprising.
- b. The detained denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on 11 September 2001 and also denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or United States interests.
- 5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

Page 2 of 2

Department of Defense Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

30 July 2007

TO:

KHALED AHMAD

SUBJECT:

UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF KHALED AHMAD

- 1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
- 2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
- 3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

- 1. The detained traveled to Afghanistan because he was responding to a fatwa issued by a Sheikh. The detainee's recruiter told him he should go fight. The detainee wanted to go to Kashmir, Pakistan, to fight.
- 2. The detainee stated his recruiter facilitated getting his passport, visa to Pakistan, and airline tickets.
- 3. The detainee stated in December 1999 he traveled from Aden, Yemen to Kabul, Afghanistan via Sanaa, Yemen, Karachi, Pakistan, Quetta, Pakistan, and Buldak, Afghanistan. In Quetta, Pakistan, the detainee stayed at a Taliban guest house.
 - 4. The detainee was identified as being on the Taliban front lines in Kabul, Afghanistan.
- 5. The detained stated he was with the Taliban on the Bagram, Afghanistan, line when the bombing started. The front line was broken and the Northern Alliance advanced. The detained retreated to a guest house, then he went to the Tora Bora region of Afghanistan.
- 6. The detainee was identified as fighting on the front line in Bagram, Afghanistan and being in charge of a group in Tora Bora, Afghanistan.
 - 7. The detainee stated he spent approximately 18 to 19 days in Tora Bora, Afghanistan.

DMO Exhibit 1 Page 1 of 3

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF KHALED AHMAD

- 8. The detainee was identified as an al Qaida instructor. The detainee trained fighters on the use of Kalashnikov rifles and grenades at an unidentified location near the Bagram, Afghanistan airport. The detainee constantly preached about al Qaida and stated he received money from al Qaida.
- 9. The detainee was identified as somebody who is experienced in explosives and was an instructor at al Farouq Training Camp. The detainee instructed trainees on all types of artillery.
 - 10. The detainee was identified as a Yemeni al Qaida member.
 - 11. The detainee stated he went to a Taliban leader and asked to join.

b. Training

- 1. The detained trained twice at al Farouq Training Camp in Afghanistan. The first time the detained was at al Farouq, the training involved basic training. The second time the detained attended al Farouq, the training involved advanced training that included mountain warfare and tactical training.
- 2. At all Farouq, the detained received basic training which included Kalashnikov rifles, M-16s, PK machine guns, rocket-propelled grenades, hand grenades, and explosives. The detained received three days of topography training that included how to use a compass and maps. The detained received tactical training in army fighting, attacking and retreating. A large percentage of the detained's training involved physical exercise, including digging trenches.

c. Connections/Associations

- 1. A source described the detainee as being a follower of Usama bin Laden; as being dangerous, and as hating Americans.
- 2. The detainee's name was contained on a list of captured Mujahedin associated with a senior al Qaida member.
- 3. The detainee's name was discovered on a list of names recovered from raids of a suspected al Qaida safe house in Pakistan.
- 4. The detainee stated that after completing basic training at al Farouq, he went to a guest house in Kabul, Afghanistan. At the guest house, the detainee was given a weapon and taken to the front lines of fighting against the Northern Alliance.
- 5. The detainee stated his brother previously traveled to Afghanistan to join jihad against the Russians.
 - 6. The detainee's brother is on a foreign country's list of al Qaida in Afghanistan.

DMO Exhibit 1 Page 2 of 3

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF KHALED AHMAD

- 7. The detainee stated authorities planned to arrest the detainee's brother in connection with the USS COLE bombing.
- 8. The detained stated he saw Usama bin Laden in Tora Bora, Afghanistan, in November 2001, when Usama bin Laden spoke to a group of people there.
 - d. Other Relevant Data
 - 1. The detained stated he is willing to fight for jihad or the struggle.
- 2. When asked his opinion about the attack on the USS COLE, the detained replied that they deserved what they got.
- 4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
- a. The detainee stated that while at al Farouq, he did not take an oath and also insisted he is not a member of al Qaida.
- b. The detainee stated he did not fight in Tora Bora, Afghanistan and that he was only a guard.
- c. The detained denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on 11 September 2001.
- d. The detainee denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or United States interests.
- e. The detainee stated that when he returns to Yemen, he plans to spend time with his family, get married and find a job.
- 5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

DMO Exhibit 1 Page 3 of 3

Department of Defense Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

21 May 2007

TO:

MUHAMMED ABDULLAH MUHMMAD AL HAMIRI

SUBJECT:

UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE

REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF MUHAMMED ABDULLAH

MUHMMAD AL HAMIRI

- 1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
- 2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
- 3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
 - a. Commitment
- 1. The detainee stated he traveled from Yemen to Pakistan. The detainee took a bus to the border and switched to a car to drive around the border checkpoint, and then on to Kandahar, Afghanistan.
 - 2. The Pakistani police captured the detainee at the border on or about 16 December, 2001.
 - b. Training
 - 1. A source stated the detainee trained at the al Farouq Training Camp in Afghanistan.
 - 2. An additional source identified the detainee as training at al Farouq.
- 3. A source stated the al Farouq training camp was funded by al Qaida and provided all students with weapons training, a basic commando course, topography training, and explosives training.
 - c. Connections/Associations
- 1. (U) The detainee was identified as being at the Nebras guest house, where he spoke with Usama bin Laden.

DMO Exhibit 1 Page 1 of 2

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF MUHAMMED ABDULLAH MUHMMAD AL HAMIRI

- 2. A source stated the Nebras Guest House was used by fighters heading to the al Farouq Training Camp and by Usama bin Laden.
- 3. The detainee stated he found a group of Arab fighters to accompany as they attempted to escape and cross the border into Pakistan.
- 4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
- a. The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on 11 September, 2001 and having knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on United States interests.
- b. The detainee claims he left Yemen, for Pakistan, for medical treatment and was tricked by a British resident into going into Afghanistan where he did nothing for six months.
 - c. The detainee denied knowledge of the British resident's affiliation with any organizations.
- 5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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DMO Exhibit 1 Page 2 of 2

Department of Defense Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

22 June 2007

TO:

MOHAMMED BASARDAH

SUBJECT:

UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF MOHAMMED BASARDAH

- 1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
- 2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
- 3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

- 1. While on a pilgrimage to Mecca, Saudi Arabia the detainee was influenced by a sheikh who discussed jihad being waged in Afghanistan, and it was an obligation for Muslims to fight at least one jihad in their lifetime.
- 2. Sheikh Hamud al Uqqla was a Saudi Mufti, a specialist in Islamic Law authorized to issue a fatwa. Al Uqqla issued a fatwa calling for jihad in Afghanistan. Al Uqqla also condoned the 11 September 2001 attacks and continued to raise money for Usama bin Laden until his death in Saudi Arabia in 2001.
- 3. The detainee stated he attended meetings at a Jamat al Tabiligh member's house for two months. The member held meetings to recruit young men to go fight jihad in Afghanistan.
- 4. Jamat all Tabiligh is a Pakistan based Islamic missionary organization used as a cover to mask travel and activities of terrorists, including members of all Qaida.
- 5. The detainee stated he traveled from Yemen to Afghanistan via United Arab Emirates, and Pakistan. The detainee crossed the border near Spin Buldak, Afghanistan without showing any identification.
- 6. The detainee stated he attended an Islamic institute in Kandahar, Afghanistan for one month. The detainee's instructors supported the fatwa issued by a sheikh calling for the brothers to fight in Afghanistan against Masoud.

DMO Exhibit 1 Page 1 of 3

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF MOHAMMED BASARDAH

- 7. The detainee stated he was given a weapon and told to fight the Northern Alliance in Bagram, Afghanistan.
- 8. The detainee stated he stayed at the al Nebras and Hajji Habbash Guest Houses in Kandahar, Afghanistan, in April and May 2001, before and after the detainee attended the al Farouq Training Camp. The al Nebras Guest House was for newcomers and was where all new recruits reported. The Hajji Habbash Guest House was for the very important people.
 - 9. The detainee stated he was sent to the front lines in Talogan, Afghanistan.
- 10. The detainee fought on the front lines in Taloqan, Afghanistan where he was burned on his chest. The detainee was treated for his burn and went back to the Taloqan Guest House. After recovering from his injuries, the detainee returned to the front lines.
- 11. The detainee stated after a week at the front, the detainee was ordered to withdraw. The detainee went to the mountains around Tora Bora, Afghanistan, the rallying point for all Arab fighters. Tora Bora was under bombardment by United States Forces during this time and many Arabs were killed.
- 12. Usama bin Laden gave the order to withdraw after a month and a half at Tora Bora. The detainee went to Pakistan where he was captured by the Pakistan Military.
- 13. The detainee was identified as someone who claimed to be an al Qaida poisons and explosives expert who worked for Usama bin Laden.

b. Training

The detainee stated he attended the al Farouq Training Camp for approximately one month in April 2001 and received training in the use of the AK-47, the Becka, rocket propelled grenades, handguns, how to dig foxholes, and how to march with a 25 kilogram pack.

c. Connections/Associations

- The detainee stayed at the Nebras Arab Guest House that was used by fighters headed to training at al Farouq and by Usama bin Laden.
- 2. The detainee met and listened to Usama bin Laden speak words of encouragement and enthusiasm to the fighters at the Nebras Guest House.
- 3. The detainee stated he dropped an injured fighter off for treatment at the al Wafa organization. While al Wafa claimed to be a humanitarian Islamic charity organization, they in

DMO Exhibit 1 Page 2 of 3

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF MOHAMMED BASARDAH

fact funneled money and supplies to al Qaida and the Taliban, including medical equipment and weapons.

- 4. The United States Department of Homeland Security designated Al Wafa al Igatha al Islamia a terrorist organization and placed it on the terrorist exclusion list.
- 5. The detainee stated he was given a radio by an individual at the camp in the Tora Bora complex in Afghanistan.
- 6. The detainee stated the individual who gave the detainee the radio served as an Emir for a group of fighters in the Tora Bora region of Afghanistan and was also in charge of the Khalden Training Camp.

d. Other Relevant Data

- 1. The detained had been imprisoned eight times in Saudi Arabia for stealing motorcycles and cars, and for illegal entry. At the end of 1995, the detained was exiled from Saudi Arabia.
- 4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
- a. The detainee stated he had no prior knowledge of plans to attack the USS Cole, the 11 September 2001 attack on New York City, or any current or future plans for attacks on the United States.
- b. The detainee stated he did not agree with the attacks of 11 September 2001. If released, the detainee would go back to his wife in Yemen and he would not fight anymore jihad because the detainee already fulfilled his one time obligation.
- 5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

DMO Exhibit 1 Page 3 of 3

Department of Defense Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

2 July 2007

TO:

MUHAMMED ALI HUSAYN

SUBJECT:

UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF MUHAMMED ALI HUSAYN

- 1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
- 2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
- 3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
 - a. Commitment
- 1. The detainee stated he had been to the Dimaj Institute and Mosque on one occasion, shortly before Muqbil al Waeda, the founder of the Institute, died.
- 2. A source stated Salafist Islamic instruction and jihad are taught at the Dimaj Institute. Students who display a devoted interest are then given military-type training and are sent to fight in Iraq or Afghanistan. Students frequently discuss killing Americans in Iraq and Afghanistan. Many imams from Yemen who attend the Dimaj Institute issue fatwas to students, advising it is good to become a suicide bomber in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Saudi Arabia.
- 3. The detainee stated a man, who had previously spent time in Afghanistan, accompanied him and facilitated his travel to Afghanistan in August 2001.
- 4. The detained stated the man he traveled with to Afghanistan went there to train in an all Qaida training camp.
- 5. The detainee was at a guest house on 11 September 2001, when he heard about the attacks. The detainee wanted to leave because he was concerned about retaliation by the Americans.
- 6. Prior to Ramadan 2001, the manager of the guest house in Kabul, Afghanistan arranged for the detainee to travel to Logar, Afghanistan and then to Khost, Afghanistan. The detainee

DMO Exhibit 1 Page 1 of 3

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF MUHAMMED ALI HUSAYN

stayed at the home of an Afghan. After staying at the house for about one and a half weeks, the detained decided to leave with a group of five Arabs and an Afghan guide.

- 7. The Afghan guide took the detainee and five other Arabs through the mountains by foot where they met another 19 fleeing men and joined their group.
- 8. The group continued to the Pakistan border where they were detained by authorities and jailed for approximately two weeks. On 3 January 2002, the detained was transferred to United States military custody.

b. Connections/Associations

- 1. The detainee stayed in a guest house in the Karti-Barwan area of Kabul, Afghanistan. The manager of the guest house arranged transportation for guests to a Taliban training area 35 minutes north of Kabul.
- 2. A source stated he saw the detainee at the Nebras Guest House. The source stated the detainee was always sent with new people wherever they went.

c. Other Relevant Data

- 1. In approximately 1999, the detainee stated he attended the University of Islamic Studies in Karachi, Pakistan for three weeks, but he left the university because there were too few classes in Arabic. The detainee claims that his cousin referred him to the school and paid his expenses.
- 2. The detainee stated he went to Afghanistan to teach the Koran in Arabic; however, the detainee stated he did not actually teach the Koran.
- 3. Initially, the detainee stated he lost his passport at the guest house he was staying at in Kabul, Afghanistan then the detainee admitted to giving his passport to the manager of the guest house for safe keeping.
- 4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
- a. The detained denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on 11 September 2001, or knowledge of any rumors or plans for future attacks on the United States or its interests.
- b. In reference to the 11 September 2001 attacks, the detainee stated he felt it was a crime and it was wrong that so many innocent people were killed.
- c. The detainee claimed he was not in Afghanistan to participate in jihad and he did not have a weapon while in Afghanistan.

DMO Exhibit 1 Page 2 of 3

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF MUHAMMED ALI HUSAYN

- d. The detainee denied being associated with the Taliban while he was in Afghanistan.
- e. If released, the detainee would return to Yemen and marry a cousin who has been betrothed to him and never leave.
- 5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

DMO Exhibit 1 Page 3 of 3

Department of Defense Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

30 March 2007

To:

SAID MUHAMMED SALIH HATIM

SUBJECT:

UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF SAID MUHAMMED SALIH HATIM

- 1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
- 2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
- 3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

- 1. The detainee stated he became interested in Russia's war in Chechnya because he witnessed the oppression on television. The detainee said he was outraged about what the Russians were doing to the Chechans and he decided to travel there to fight jihad alongside his Muslim brothers.
- 2. The detainee stated he went to Afghanistan prior to going to Chechnya in order to obtain training at the al Farouq Training Camp. The detainee wanted to refine his shooting skills at the camp and possibly learn to shoot a rocket propelled grenade.
- 3. The detainee traveled by Air Yemeni to Karachi, Pakistan and took a bus to Quetta, Pakistan. The detainee crossed into Afghanistan without being confronted by any border patrol.
- 4. While in Kandahar, Afghanistan the detainee stated he actively sought how to get to the al Farouq Training Camp.
 - 5. The detainee stayed at al Farouq Training Camp for approximately three weeks.
- 6. The detainee admitted to being part of Said Central Station, which the detainee described as a group of 15 Arabs positioned on the Kabul line in Afghanistan.

DMO Exhibit 1 Page 1 of 3

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF SAID MUHAMMED SALIH HATIM

- 7. The detainee stated Said Central Station was at the rear lines of fighting and he described it as a place of re-supply for the front lines near Bagram, Afghanistan. On occasion the detainee would check out a Kalashnikov rifle from a warehouse and take a 30 minute ride to the front lines. The detainee stated he brought food to the Taliban soldiers on the front lines fighting against the Northern Alliance.
- 8. The detainee stated he traveled to Jalalabad, Afghanistan once the bombing of Kabul began. The detainee took a cab to the Pakistan border and met an Afghan at the border town. The Afghan eventually took the detainee to a Pakistan police station.

b. Training

- 1. The detainee served in the Yemeni National Service, National Guard in 1994-1995. The detainee was trained at the Elem Military Camp as a policeman for the military.
- 2. The detainee received approximately one month of military training, including small arms training at al Farouq Training Camp.
- 3. Al Farouq was a known Training Camp. The four-phase training program included small arms training, physical training, map reading, topography and explosive devices.

c. Connections/Associations

- 1. The detainee's name and contents of his trust account were found on different files recovered from various computers seized during raids against al Qaida associated safe houses in Rawalpindi and Karachi, Pakistan.
- 2. The detainee stayed at the Taliban house in Quetta, Pakistan for approximately one to two days. The detainee recalled this was a special place for students, but he received no briefings about jihad and did not see any weapons at the house.
- 3. The detainee traveled to Kandahar, Afghanistan and stayed at a guest house known as the Haja House for approximately one week. The detainee said he used this time to understand what they were asking him to do, to fight jihad.
- 4. The detainee stated the first Arab house he stayed at in Kabul, Afghanistan was called Carte Birwan, and was protected by two armed guards. The detainee stated he stayed at Carte Birwan for approximately 40 days. The next Arab house in Kabul, Afghanistan the detainee stayed at was called Gholam Batcha. The detainee stayed at Gholam Batcha for one month.
- 5. A source stated the Rahim Ghulam Bacha Safe House in Kabul, Afghanistan, is owned and operated by al Qaida.

DMO Exhibit 1 Page 2 of 3

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF SAID MUHAMMED SALIH HATIM

- 6. From June or July 2001, to early November 2001, the detainee mentioned he stayed at the Hamza al Qaiti Guest House in the Wazir Akbar Khan area of Kabul, Afghanistan.
- 7. The Hamza al Qaiti Guest House is one of four known safe houses owned and operated by al Qaida in and around Kabul, Afghanistan. The Hamza al Qaiti Guest House was primarily used by Saudi Arabian and Yemeni al Qaida members.
- 4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
- a. The detainee stated he did not want to partake in the war in Afghanistan because it was a civil war in which Muslims were fighting other Muslims. The detainee decided to put his decision to fight in Chechnya on the back burner for a while.
- b. While in Kabul, the detainee thought of getting married and finding a job. The detainee also mentioned that he does not know if he ever met people associated with al Qaida, adding that these things were never discussed in the detainee's presence.
- c. The detainee stayed at the Said Central Station approximately three weeks playing soccer, reading, and riding horses. The detainee stressed that he did not deliver food to the front lines.
- d. The detainee reports that he was not given any responsibility while he was in Kabul, Afghanistan. When asked how the detainee could be evaluated if he was given no responsibility, the detainee did not have an answer. In addition, the detainee had no answer why he would be paid for doing nothing.
- e. The detainee left al Farouq Training Camp early because it was not what he expected. To get out early, the detainee faked a fever telling the people he was ill and needed to seek medical care. The detainee said he wanted to leave earlier, but could not think of a good excuse. The detainee stated the trainers were always yelling at him, the food was terrible and he was forced to sleep on the ground. The detainee stated he did not like anything about the training and wanted to quit on the first day.
- 5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

DMO Exhibit (

Page 3 of 3

Department of Defense Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

27 January 2007

TO:

AL HAJ, RIYAD ATIQ ALI ABDU

SUBJECT:

UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL HAJ, RIYAD ATIQ ALI ABDU

- 1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
- 2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
- 3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

- 1. The detainee met a man at a mosque, and the detainee was recruited to go to Afghanistan.
- 2. The detainee's recruiter assisted the detainee in obtaining the money necessary to purchase plane tickets to Pakistan.
- 3. The detainee traveled to and stayed at a Taliban guest house for approximately 15 days.
- 4. The detainee left the Taliban guest house with other unknown Arabs after the Taliban made arrangements to take the group to Kandahar, Afghanistan for approximately 10 to 14 days.
- 5. The detainee and his recruiter left a Kandahar, Afghanistan guest house with the unknown group of Arabs in a pick-up truck and were taken to another guest house located in the Wazir Akbar Khan district of Kabul, Afghanistan for approximately six to seven days where he talked with others about the front line.
- The detainee stayed at a Taliban guest house known as the Kabul House in Kabul, Afghanistan.
- 7. The detainee stated he spent approximately one month with the Taliban on the rear line at or near Kabul, Afghanistan.

DMO Exhibit 1 Page 1 of 3

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL HAJ, RIYAD ATIQ ALI ABDU

- 8. The detainee left the guest house in Kabul, Afghanistan to go to the front line towards Bagram, Afghanistan.
- 9. After seeing what was going on and seeing that the Taliban were trying to serve Islam, the detained decided to serve the Taliban in any manner except fighting.
- 10. The detainee was identified as being on the Taliban front lines in Kabul, Afghanistan during late 1999 and early 2000.
- 11. After arriving at the front line, the detainee was issued a Kalashnikov rifle and one 30 round magazine of ammunition. The detainee spent approximately one month on the front line.
- 12. The detainee was identified as being in Tora Bora, Afghanistan and was in charge of delivering food supplies to the fighters and also delivered approximately 3,000 United States Dollars to the Emir at Tora Bora.
- 13. The detainee was captured by Pakistan authorities while attempting to cross the Pakistan border on foot through the mountains.
- 14. The detainee was identified as a leader of 10 to 15 men and drove a Toyota pick-up truck that was used to haul supplies to the front lines.
- 15. The detainee was identified as having a lot of experience because of the long time he spent at al Farouq Training Camp and on the front lines fighting the Northern Alliance.
- 16. The detainee taught others how to train people in various advanced things such as tanks and explosives.

b. Training

- 1. After graduating high school, the detainee joined the Yemen military for one year. While in the military, the detainee served in the office of a Deputy Commander. The detainee trained on the use of a Kalashnikov rifle and the rocket propelled grenade launcher.
- 2. An al Qaida operative identified the detainee and stated he was trained by the detainee at the al Farouq Training Camp. The al Qaida operative stated the training included instruction in the use of the rocket propelled grenade launchers, the AK-47 assault rifle, PK machine guns and handguns.
 - c. Other Relevant Data

Page 2 of 3

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL HAJ, RIYAD ATIQ ALI ABDU

- 1. A foreign government identified the detainee as a Yemeni jihadist holding a Yemeni passport and believed the detainee to be in Afghanistan as of late December 2001.
- 2. The detainee stated his purpose for participating with the Taliban was to get to know the Taliban, who was fighting for the Taliban and to find out about the Taliban culture.
- 3. The detainee's name was on a list of captured Mujahedin found on a computer hard drive associated with a known al Qaida operative and was seized in a raid.
- 4. The detainee's name, aliases and nationality appeared on a document list of 324 Arabic names recovered from safe house raids associated with suspected al Qaida in Pakistan.
- 5. The detainee's name, alias and contents of his trust account appeared on a list of al Qaida Mujahedin. The list was on computer media recovered during raids against al Qaida associated safe houses in Pakistan.
- 4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
 - a. The detainee stated his purpose for traveling to Afghanistan was to find a wife.
- b. The detainee denied information that placed the detainee in Tora Bora, Afghanistan delivering food and supplies and giving money to an Emir. The detainee stated that he never delivered anything to anyone. The detainee stated he was not in Tora Bora and did not deliver supplies.
- 5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

Page 3 of 3

Department of Defense Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

17 October 2007

To: ABDALLAHYIV, UMAR BIN HAMZA

Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ABDALLAHYIV, UMAR BIN HAMZA

- 1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
- 2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
- 3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

- 1. The detainee stated that in 1992 internal fighting in Tajikistan caused his family to flee to Konduz, Afghanistan. The detainee stated that in 1994 his father went back to Tajikistan and was allegedly executed by hostile forces.
- 2. The detainee stated that in 1995 he and his family moved to a camp near Mazar-e-Sharif, Afghanistan. The detainee stated people from the Islamic fundamentalist group Nahzat-Islami ran the camp and signed up all males in the camp to their organization. Nahzat-Islami fought the government of Tajukistan.
- 3. The detainee stated that in 2000 he and his family moved to a Tajiki refugee camp in Takhar, Afghanistan. The detainee stated they stayed about a year in Takhar and then the detainee and his family moved to a refugee camp called Camp Babu near Peshawar, Pakistan in 2001.
- Information indicates that the Pakistan Secret Service, Taliban and al Qaida were training male and female suicide attackers at Camp Babu in Pakistan.

b. Training

ISN 257 DMO Exhibit 1 Page 1 of 6

Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ABDALLAHYIV, UMAR BIN HAMZA

- A source stated that the detainee took a poisons class in late 2001. A source stated that the detainee stayed at the Uzbek guest house in the Wazir Akbar Khan area of Kabul, Afghanistan.
- A source stated the individual in the previous statement is an al Qaida explosives trainer who instructed jihadists on improvised explosive devices in Jalalabad and Kabul, Afghanistan.
- A source stated he heard the detainee is well trained in tactics, the AK-47, and other basic training weapons.

c. Connections/Associations

- The detainee stated thousands of Tajiks fled to numerous refugee camps in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The detainee stated the Islamic Movement of Tajikistan was present in many refugee camps and was spreading their message of wanting an Islamic government in Tajikistan. The Islamic Movement of Tajikistan controlled movement of Tajik refugees from one camp to another.
- 2. The detainee stated he heard information about the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan while he lived in Camp Babi, Pakistan.
- 3. The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, IMU, is a coalition of Islamic militants from Uzbekistan and other Central Asian states opposed to Uzbekistani President Islom Karimov's secular regime. Although the primary goal remains to overthrow Karimov and establish an Islamic state in Uzbekistan, IMU political and ideological leader Tohir Yoldashev is working to rebuild the organization and it appears to have widened the IMU's targets to include all those he perceives as fighting Islam. The IMU generally has been unable to operate in Uzbekistan and thus has been more active in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan.
- A source stated associates of the detainee in Kabul, Afghanistan included two individuals.
- One of the individuals in the previous statement controlled a guest house and a training camp in Kabul, Afghanistan.
- 6. A source stated the other individual was a senior al Qaida member and former commander of the Arab Brigade.

d. Other Relevant Data

ISN 257 DMO Exhibit 1 Page 2 of 6

Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ABDALLAHYIV, UMAR BIN HAMZA

- The detainee stated that in December 2001, the Pakistani police found several books and manuals in the detainee's bag. These books and manuals were written in Russian and contained information relating to explosives, chemical and poison weapons.
- 2. The detainee stated an Afghan Ministry of Defense officer gave him the books and manuals in 1995 when the detainee was living in Mazar-e-Sharif, Afghanistan. The detainee was given the books because the detainee could speak and write in Russian and would have an interest in looking at the materials.
- 3. The detainee stated the three notebooks in his possession when he was arrested were in his handwriting. The detainee copied the information from handwritten notebooks. The first notebook contained information about Russian weapon characteristics, map reading and military symbols. The second notebook contained information on chemistry of explosives and poisons and how to create them. The third notebook contained information about communications and leadership in a counterintelligence unit.
- 4. The journals reveal the detainee had studied at a Madrasa for at least a year under the Taliban.
- 5. The detainee did not copy from already produced materials such as training manuals. The journal notes are too disjointed and filled with gaps and errors to have been copied. The detainee almost certainly composed these journals as a student at a terrorist training camp in Afghanistan or Pakistan.
- 6. A source stated the detainee's story is unlikely because information about chemical and explosive formulation would be very close-hold and not likely to be easily passed from person to person. The source stated the detainee was probably associated with the production of chemicals and explosives if the detainee possessed the written documentation.
- 7. The detainee stated that when he was arrested, he was also carrying handwritten documents bearing the names of Mujahedin fighters and weapon serial numbers.
- 8. The detainee stated a member of Nahzat-Islami befriended the detainee. The detainee stated the detainee was at the member's home in 1998 during a meeting with other men, who were either Nahzat-Islami or Mujahedin, when the detainee copied the list of these fighters' names and weapon serial numbers.
- 9. A source stated the detainee is from Saudi Arabia and was in Kabul, Afghanistan fighting on the front lines. The source stated the detainee claims to be from

ISN 257 DMO Exhibit 1 Page 3 of 6

Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ABDALLAHYIV, UMAR BIN HAMZA

Tajikistan, but is not.

- 4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer;
 - a. The detainee stated he was never recruited or served as a member of the Taliban, al Qaida or any other organized group.
 - b. The detainee stated he has no knowledge of any individuals who are associated with any terrorist group or organization.
 - c. The detainee stated he knew of Usama bin Laden but never saw him, and he was not aware of Usama bin Laden's fatwa.
 - d. The detainee stated that despite his admitted association with members of Nahzat-Islami and Mujahedin fighters, he never joined these groups but understood what their political aims were.
 - e. The detainee stated he was aware of all the fighting in Afghanistan and said he did not side with any particular group. He said he just wanted peace.
 - f. The detainee stated he has no military or terrorist experience or training.
 - g. The detainee stated he has not been to any terrorist training camp to include any all Qaida training camps.
 - h. The detainee stated he never owned or carried any weapons.
 - i. The detainee stated he received no training from Nahzat-Islami.
 - j. The detained stated he received no training at all on poisons. He stated he was unaware of any training, which may have taken place in the refugee camps he was in.
 - k. The detainee stated he was never in Kabul, Afghanistan and denied knowledge of the Uzbek guest house located in the Wazir Akbar Khan Area of Kabul.
 - The detainee stated his five-year possession of the notebooks had no purpose. He
 stated he had no intent to use the information, had never shown the books to anyone,
 and had never used the information himself. He stated he understood that having them
 would draw criminal scrutiny by authorities.
 - m. The detainee stated he was not sent on any mission to deliver his notebooks and stated he read the books no more than once or twice when he transcribed his notes.

ISN 257 DMO Exhibit 1 Page 4 of 6

Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ABDALLAHYIV, UMAR BIN HAMZA

The detainee stated he was not in any type of school room or training environment and insisted his notes were copied from a textbook. The detainee stated he had no affiliation with the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan.

- n. The detainee stated he did not know how to use any of the weapons detailed in the notebooks, and he did not know anything other than map reading.
- o. The detainee denied he obtained books containing information on how to build bombs for any reason other than curiosity and wanting to be a soldier some day. The detainee stated he never tried to make any of the bombs in the book.
- p. The detainee stated he is not currently in jihad and personally has nothing against the United States.
- q. The detainee stated he was upset when he heard of the attacks on the United States.
- r. The detainee stated he would not hurt someone else unless they hurt him first. The detainee stated he has never killed any person, civilian or military.
- s. The detainee stated he does not wish to return to Tajikistan, Pakistan or Afghanistan because all of these governments were not good. He stated he would find his mother and seek asylum in whatever country would take him.
- t. The detainee stated he did not understand the technical information contained in the manuals but kept them because of his growing interest in military organizations. The detainee stated he wanted to someday join the military and become a soldier and believed these manuals on weapons of war would be useful in this pursuit.
- u. The detainee stated he was framed and made to write the notebooks and come up with the story about why and how he was captured. The detainee stated he was forced by his original captures to write the notebooks that were in his possession when he was turned over to the United States Forces in Afghanistan. The detainee stated he was afraid to tell the truth.
- v. The detainee stated he was forced to copy into the notebook a letter he had in his possession when he was arrested.
- 5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against

ISN 257 DMO Exhibit 1 Page 5 of 6

Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ABDALLAHYIV, UMAR BIN HAMZA

continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

ISN 257 DMO Exhibit 1 Page 6 of 6

Department of Defense Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

24 April 2007

To:

NAYIF A AL NUKHIYLAN

SUBJECT:

UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF NAYIF A AL NUKHIYLAN

- 1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
- 2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
- 3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
 - a. Commitment
 - 1. The detainee stated he entered Afghanistan in approximately August 2000.
- 2. The detainee was in Afghanistan for one year and four months at the time of his capture.
 - b. Connections and Associations
- 1. The detainee had a conversation with an Imam who recommended that the detainee go to Afghanistan and fight for jihad.
- 2. The detainee met a student at religious classes held at a mosque who gave the detainee 4,000 Saudi Arabian Riyals to go to Afghanistan.
- 3. The detainee realized that the man who gave him money to defray travel costs to Afghanistan must have been an al Qaida facilitator and recruiter.
- 4. The detainee spent four months at the Bayt al Arab Guest House, Kandahar, Afghanistan and attended the institute for Arabic studies in Kandahar.
- 5. The Bayt al Arab Guest House in Kandahar, Afghanistan was maintained by Usama bin Laden.

	Page 1	of 3
DMO	Exhibit	<u> </u>

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF NAYIF A AL NUKHIYLAN

- 6. The Arabic studies institute, Kandahar, Afghanistan, may have received support from the Taliban government, as well as from high-level members of the Taliban government who visited the institute.
- 7. The detainee's name was on a document listing 324 Arabic names, aliases, and nationalities recovered from safe house raids associated with suspected al Qaida in Pakistan.

c. Training

- 1. The detainee stated he went to al Farouq Training Camp, Kandahar, Afghanistan for basic training.
- 2. The detainee stated he attended the al Farouq Training Camp for twenty five days where he received Kalashnikov and PK rifle training.
- 3. The detainee stated he knew the al Farouq Training Camp belonged to Usama bin Laden. Additionally, the detainee stated when he arrived at the camp, he knew it was a terrorist camp.
- 4. The detainee trained for two months at an al Qaida Training Camp in northern Jalalabad, Afghanistan.
- 5. The detainee stated he stayed six to seven months at the Moroccan Training Camp, Jalalabad, Afghanistan.
- 6. The detainee admitted to training for two days on mortars at the Moroccan Training Camp, Jalalabad, Afghanistan.
 - 7. A source stated that he trained on city tactics with the detainee.
 - 8. A source stated that the detainee was at the city tactics course.
- 9. The city tactics course length was five to six weeks long and primarily covered assassinations in urban areas. The training was held at the Tarnak Farms Camp, Kandahar, Afghanistan.
- 10. The Tarnak Farms Camp, Kandahar, Afghanistan, was considered the most important al Qaida Training Camp in Afghanistan since it was where al Qaida operatives received advanced operational training including urban assault and other tactics.

d. Other relevant data

1. The detainee was aware of many pro-jihad fatwa's and dropped out of school in order to join jihad.

UNCLASSIFIED

Page 2 of 3

DMO Exhibit

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF NAYIF A AL NUKHIYLAN

- 2. The detainee told the man who ran the Bayt al Arab Guest House in Kandahar, Afghanistan, that he wished to fight the jihad.
- 3. The detainee stated that in September 2000 he arrived in Kandahar, Afghanistan, where he joined the Arab Mujahedin.
- 4. The detainee stated that he had conversations with the al Farouq Camp Manager that were religious related, regarding suicide missions being part of Islam.
- 4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

The detainee stated that he wanted to participate in jihad for religious purposes and to help people in need. Furthermore, the detainee stated this would strengthen his relationship with god and his goal was to help out for two months and then return home.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

DMO Exhibit____

Page 3 of 3

Department of Defense Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

2 April 2007

TO:

FADIL HUSAYN SALIH HINTIF

SUBJECT:

UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF FADIL HUSAYN SALIH HINTIF

- 1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
- 2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
- 3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

- 1. While in Sanaa, Yemen, the detainee attended religious services at Abu Bakr al Sadeeq mosque.
- 2. While at the mosque in Sanaa, Yemen, the detainee met an individual and this individual questioned the detainee about going to Afghanistan to help poor Afghans. The detainee felt this would be a chance to do something good in memory of his deceased father.
- 3. The detainee stated he heard various fatwas and decided to go to Afghanistan for jihad. The detainee traveled from Yemen with two individuals, one of whom the detainee had met at a mosque in Sanaa, Yemen. In June 2001, the trio traveled via Karachi, Pakistan, to Kandahar, Afghanistan, where they stayed at a guest house.
- 4. The detainee stated after one week at the guest house in Kandahar, Afghanistan the detainee moved to Kabul, Afghanistan, where the detainee stayed at a guest house under the command of a Saudi national.
- 5. The detainee stated the address of the house for Arabs in Kabul, Afghanistan was Wazira Akbar Kham.

DMO Exhibit 1 Page 1 of 3

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF FADIL HUSAYN SALIH HINTIF

- 6. A Taliban safe house was located on Wazir Akbar Khan Street in Kabul, Afghanistan, near the hospital. Taliban soldiers and Arab travelers routinely stayed at the house while passing through Kabul.
- 7. The detainee stated he worked as an assistant on a medical team distributing medicines for the Taliban.
- 8. The detainee stated he was a volunteer for the Red Crescent, but was not an official employee. The detainee delivered medical supplies and food.
- 9. The detainee stated when he received word that Northern Alliance soldiers were looking for Arabs, the detainee traveled with another individual to Logar, Afghanistan.
- 10. The detainee traveled from the Logar province, Afghanistan, to Jalalabad, Afghanistan once the Northern Alliance arrived in Kabul, Afghanistan.
- 11. After some time in Jalaiabad, Afghanistan an Afghan man arrived and told the detainee he would bring him over the border to Pakistan.
- 12. The detainee was detained with a group of Arabs in approximately December 2001 while crossing into Pakistan from Afghanistan. Several members of the group were confessed members of al Qaida while others admitted to fighting on the behalf of the Taliban.

b. Other Relevant Data

- 1. The detainee's name was on a document recovered from a safe house raid associated with suspected al Qaida in Karachi, Pakistan.
- 2. The detainee was captured while in possession of a Casio watch model, also used in bombings linked to al Qaida and radical Islamic terrorist improvised explosive devices.
- 4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
- a. The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on 11 September 2001.
- b. The detainee stated he was aware of the Taliban prior to leaving Yemen, but knew nothing of al Qaida prior to his arrival in Cuba. The detainee claims he did not know the guest houses he stayed in were associated with al Qaida.
- c. The detainee went to Afghanistan to do charity work for God and to honor his father who is dead. The detainee did not go there to fight the jihad.

DMO Exhibit 1 Page 2 of 3

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF FADIL HUSAYN SALIH HINTIF

- d. The detainee did not receive any training in Afghanistan. The detainee did not fight in Afghanistan because he was not convinced of the causes that were being fought for. The detainee felt that the groups there were fighting for power, and that was no reason to fight a jihad.
- e. The detainee claims he is unaware of any fatwa's or clerics/scholars who issued fatwa's authorizing jihad in Afghanistan.
- f. The detainee denied any knowledge of training camps in Afghanistan. However, the detainee could not explain his association with other Arabs at the guest houses the detainee stayed in and what their purpose in Afghanistan was.
- 5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

DMO Exhibit 1 Page 3 of 3

Department of Defense Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

6 Jun 2007

TO:

ASHRAF SALIM ABD AL SALAM SULTAN

SUBJECT:

UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ASHRAF SALIM ABD AL SALAM SULTAN

- 1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
- 2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
- 3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

- 1. The detainee stated he was wanted by the Libyan government for promoting religion.
- 2. The detainee joined the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group, was assigned to the military council, and was employed by a subsidiary of the al Qaida organization in Sudan.
- 3. The Department of Homeland Security has identified the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group as a foreign terrorist group with some members aligning themselves with the al Qaida organization.
- 4. A senior al Qaida operative stated the detainee was a former member of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group.
- 5. The detainee sought refuge in the Tora Bora Mountains of Afghanistan after 11 September 2001.

b. Training

1. The detainee stated he received Kalashnikov, handgun, and hand grenade weapons training as mandated by the Libyan government.

DMO Exhibit 1 Page 1 of 2

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ASHRAF SALIM ABD AL SALAM SULTAN

- 2. The detainee underwent training at the Khaldan and Jihad Wal Camps in Afghanistan.
- 3. The Khaldan Camp's training courses included basic military training, tactics, mortars, explosives, first aid, and the use of automatic weapons such as the Kalashnikov, American M-16, German G-3, Israeli light and heavy Uzi, Dushka heavy anti-aircraft machine gun, and Zikoyak heavy anti-aircraft machine gun.
 - c. Connections/Associations
 - 1. The detainee met a Libyan Islamic Fighting Group member in Pakistan in 1998 or 1999.
 - 2. The detainee stated his wife's family supported the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group.
 - 3. The detainee worked at a school affiliated with the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group.
 - d. Other Relevant Data
- 1. The detainee stated he stayed with other Libyans who were also fleeing the Libyan government and were selling false visas and other false documents.
 - 2. The detainee stated he hired an Afghan guide before he was arrested.
- 3. The detainee stated he decided to walk through a mountainous area into Pakistan and was arrested by Pakistani police on 18 December 2001.
- 4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

The detainee stated he is not Libyan Islamic Fighting Group, al Qaida, or Taliban.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

DMO Exhibit 1 Page 2 of 2

Department of Defense Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

19 April 2007

TO:

ABD AL RAHMAN AL HATAYBI

SUBJECT:

UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ABD AL RAHMAN AL HATAYBI

- 1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
- 2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
- 3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
 - a. Commitment
 - 1. The detainee was contacted by a recruiter for al Qaida in July or August 2001.
- 2. The detainee was recruited to train at the al Farouq Training Camp in Afghanistan. All expenses for the detainee's travel to Afghanistan were paid by the recruiter or by contacts provided by the recruiter. The detainee trained at al Farouq Training Camp and stayed at the abu Zubair safe house in Kandahar, Afghanistan. Both the camp and the safe house are associated with al Qaida.
- 3. The recruiter provided a travel itinerary to the detainee. The detainee traveled from Jeddah, Saudi Arabia to Riyadh, Saudi Arabia to Dubai, United Arab Emirates to Karachi, Pakistan to Kabul, Afghanistan, and he attended the al Farouq Training Camp.
 - 4. The detainee is a member of Jamat al Tabiligh.
- 5. Jamat al Tabiligh is a Pakistan based Islamic missionary organization used as a cover to mask travel and activities of terrorists, including members of al Qaida.
- 6. The detainee stated he was pulled out of training at the al Farouq camp and sent to the Tora Bora region of Afghanistan for three months. He was assigned to an area at the base of the mountains under the command of an Iraqi Mujahedin.
- 7. An individual observed the detainee staying at a guest house in Kabul, Afghanistan before departing to Tora Bora, Afghanistan.

UNCLASSIFIED

DMO Exhibit 1 Page 1 of 3

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ABD AL RAHMAN AL HATAYBI

8. An individual observed the detainee at Tora Bora, Afghanistan and stated the detainee worked with heavy weapons.

b. Training

- 1. The detainee stated he attended the al Farouq Training Camp for about seven weeks and trained on light weapons.
- 2. The detainee stated he met the camp commander and several small arms instructors while at the all Faruoq Training Camp in Afghanistan. The detainee stated he received light weapons training on the AK-47, Makarov pistol, and the M-16, but never fired the M-16.
- 3. An individual observed the detainee at al Farouq Training Camp in 2001. The individual stated the detainee stayed at the camp approximately three weeks where he received military training in small arms, explosives, rocket-propelled grenades, basic fighting techniques, and terrain navigation. While at the camp, the detainee was assigned to a military combatant group led by the highest ranking leader at the camp.
- 4. A source stated the detainee was in Tora Bora, Afghanistan and was trained in explosives.

c. Connections/Associations

- 1. An individual stated the detainee's cousin had joined the jihad. The individual also stated the detainee and a friend both trained at the al Farouq Training Camp in Afghanistan and traveled to Tora Bora, Afghanistan.
- 2. The detainee's name was found on documentation confiscated from a Mujahedin who entered Croatia from Bosnia.
- 3. The detainee's name was found in a handwritten letter recovered by allied personnel along with materials linked to al Qaida. The letter lists the names of the incarcerated Arabs, their aliases, and countries of origin.
- 4. The detainee's name was found on a computer hard drive recovered in a suspected al Qaida safe house. The list contained personnel incarcerated in Pakistan.
- 5. The detainee's name, hometown, and telephone number were found in a translation of an Arabic-language computer file listing contact points and telephone numbers for al Qaida Mujahedin in Pakistan.

UNCLASSIFIED

DMO Exhibit 1 Page 2 of 3

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ABD AL RAHMAN AL HATAYBI

- 6. The detainee's name appears in a list of 76 Muslim brothers who were fighting with the Taliban against the Northern Alliance and were captured in Pakistan.
- 7. The detainee's name, nationality, and information on the location of his passport was on a list recovered in raids on suspected al Qaida safehouses in Karachi, Pakistan.
- 8. One of the detainee's known aliases was on a list of captured al Qaida members that was discovered on a computer hard drive associated with a senior al Qaida member.

d. Other Relevant Data

- 1. The detainee retreated with other Arabs to Tora Bora, Afghanistan. The detainee stated he retreated with them, but fled across the border into Pakistan.
 - 2. The detainee was arrested by Pakistani police near the Afghanistan border.
 - 3. The detainee was identified as a member of al Qaida by a foreign government service.
- 4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
- a. The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on 11 September 2001, and also denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or United States interests.
- b. The detainee stated he traveled to Pakistan for the sole purpose of providing missionary work to those individuals in need of assistance.
- c. The detainee claims to have done missionary work in Karachi and Lahore, Pakistan. The detainee claims to have never set foot in Afghanistan.
- d. The detainee claims not to have owned a weapon and claims not to have had any type of weapons training.
- 5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

UNCLASSIFIED

DMO Exhibit 1 Page 3 of 3

Department of Defense Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

26 July 2007

TO:

YOUSEF ABKIR SALIH AL QARANI

SUBJECT:

UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF YOUSEF ABKIR SALIH AL QARANI

- 1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
- 2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
- 3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

- 1. The detainee stated he wanted to leave Saudi Arabia because there were no education or other opportunities available to him there. The detainee stated he heard that he could learn about computers and English in Pakistan.
- 2. The detainee stated he paid 500 Saudi Riyals to and individual at Chad's Embassy in Saudi Arabia for a fraudulent passport that had a different name and false birth date. The detainee stated he then went to the Pakistani Embassy and obtained a visa to Pakistan good for five to six months.
- 3. The detainee stated he traveled from Saudi Arabia to Pakistan. The detainee stated he arrived in Pakistan with 8,000 to 10,000 Saudi Arabian Riyals.
- 4. The detainee stated he traveled to villages around Afghanistan where he bought and distributed food with a group of people associated with Jamat-al-Tabiligh.
- 5. Jamat-al-Tabiligh is a Pakistan based Islamic missionary organization used as a cover to mask travel and activities of terrorists, including members of al Qaida.

b. Training

The detainee traveled to Afghanistan after 11 September 2001 and had been given basic training on the AK-47.

DMO Exhibit 1 Page 1 of 3

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF YOUSEF ABKIR SALIH AL QARANI

c. Connections/Associations

- 1. The detainee may have been smuggled across the border of Afghanistan in 2000 to 2001 by a senior al Qaida lieutenant.
- 2. The detainee's name was found on a letter listing probable al Qaida members incarcerated in Pakistan. This letter was recovered with other materials linked to al Qaida.
- 3. The detainee's name was found on a list of al Qaida associates, which was recovered from a suspected al Qaida safe house in Pakistan.
- 4. The detainee's name was found in a document, which contains information regarding Taliban and al Qaida fighters who were captured.
- 5. The detainee's name was found in a document in an al Qaida associated safe houses in Pakistan. It listed contact points and telephone numbers for al Qaida Mujahedin in Pakistan.
- 6. The detainee's name was on a chart listing the names of captured Mujahedin. This information is associated with an individual.
 - 7. The individual in the previous statement is a senior al Qaida operational planner.

d. Other Relevant Data

- 1. A source stated he and the detained were at the al Farouq Training Camp. The source stated he saw the detained at Tora Bora, Afghanistan. The source stated the detained's claim of being a humanitarian and relief worker is a cover story. The source stated the detained is a fighter and answered the call to jihad.
- 2. The al Farouq Training Camp was funded by al Qaida and was more advanced than other training camps in Afghanistan. Students taking the basic training class at al Farouq received training in weapons, topography and explosives, and took a basic commando course.
- 3. Indications are that the detained has been to the al Ansar Guest House in Kandahar, Afghanistan and he is also a member of the London al Qaida cell.
- 4. The al Ansar Guest House was a waypoint and support center for Arabs transitioning to and from local training camps in an area of Afghanistan.
 - 5. The detainee is a low-level al Qaida fighter.
 - 6. The detainee stated he was a member of al Qaida after being yelled at and beaten.

Page 2 of 3

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF YOUSEF ABKIR SALIH AL QARANI

- 7. The detainee was shown a photograph of himself and asked to point out where any bruises or signs of a beating were located. The detainee stated he lied about the beatings.
 - 8. The detainee was said to be a member of al Qaida.
- 4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
 - a. The detainee stated he had no weapons training and no association with Mujahedin.
 - b. The detained stated he was never in Afghanistan and was never a member of al Qaida.
- 5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

Page 3 of 3

Department of Defense Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

22 March 2007

TO:

MUTIJ'SADIZ AHMAD SAYAB

SUBJECT:

UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF MUTIJ'SADIZ AHMAD SAYAB

- 1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
- 2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
- 3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
 - a. Commitment
- 1. The detainee traveled from Algeria to Damascus, Syria, and then to Champignie, France.
- 2. In France, the detainee met an individual who convinced the detainee to travel to Afghanistan.
- 3. The detainee was instructed he had to travel through London, England prior to going to Afghanistan.
- 4. The detainee left France and traveled to London, England using a forged Belgian passport he purchased for 2,500 Francs.
- 5. While in London, England the detainee gave money to another individual so the individual could purchase a Pakistani visa and a plane ticket for the detainee to travel to Islamabad, Pakistan.
- 6. While the detainee was in London, another individual provided the detainee with a point of contact in Islamabad, Pakistan.

DMO Exhibit 1 Page 1 of 2

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF MUTIJ'SADIZ AHMAD SAYAB

- 7. Once in Pakistan, the detainee was picked up and taken to the Afghanistan border. The detainee was dropped off at the border, crossed the border by foot, and then traveled to Jalalabad, Afghanistan.
- 8. When the detainee arrived in Jalalabad, Afghanistan, he went to an Algerian guest house. The detainee stayed at this guest house for approximately three to four months.
- 9. The detainee left Jalalabad, Afghanistan, around the time of the attacks on the United States on 11 September 2001. The detainee then traveled to Kabul, Afghanistan, and stayed there for one to two months.

b. Training

1. The detainee stated he received small arms training near Jalalabad, Afghanistan, on the assembly and disassembly of the Kalashnikov rifle.

c. Other Relevant Data

- 1. After the Tora Bora bombing campaign began and the Northern Alliance pushed through Kabul and Jalalabad, Afghanistan, the detainee escaped into Pakistan. The detainee was captured in Pakistan and turned over to United States forces based at Kandahar, Afghanistan.
- 2. The detainee has been identified as someone who stayed at the guest house in Jalalabad, Afghanistan.
- 4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
- a. According to the detainee, he does not know anything about Usama bin Laden except what he had seen on the al-Jazeera satellite station.
- b. The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on 11 September 2001.
- 5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

DMO Exhibit 1 Page 2 of 2

Department of Defense Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

22 June 2007

TO:

ABD-AL-NISR MOHAMMED KHANTUMANI

SUBJECT:

UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE

REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ABD-AL-NISR MOHAMMED

KHANTUMANI

- 1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
- 2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
- 3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
 - a. Commitment
- 1. The detainee was identified by a foreign government service as a radical terrorist who fights with the forces of Usama bin Laden.
- 2. The detainee was reported to have been in Tora Bora and to have been proficient at using a rocket propelled grenade launcher.
- 3. The detainee was involved in a revolt against a Pakistani police force during the early days of confrontation in Afghanistan, when some prisoners were being transported by Pakistani authorities. A senior al Qaida operative stated that the detainee was rumored to have led the revolt.
 - 4. The detainee has been named as a leader in camp and a part of the Islamic court.
 - b. Training
- 1. The detained was identified by a foreign government service as receiving several military courses at al Qaida camps.
 - 2. The detainee was reported to have been experienced in handling explosives.

DMO Exhibit 1 Page 1 of 2

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ABD-AL-NISR MOHAMMED KHANTUMANI

- 3. The detainee received training on the Kalashnikov, while in the Syrian army.
- c. Connections/Associations
 - 1. The detainee was named as a member of the Abu al Zarqawi group.
- 2. The detainee's name was included in a computer file used by suspected al Qaida members.
- 3. The detainee owned a house next door to a known al Qaida and Taliban guest house and worked in the guest house.
 - 4. The detainee's son is also a detainee at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.
- 5. A source identified the detainee and his son as being in the same group in Tora Bora, Afghanistan.
- 4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
- a. The detainee stated that he never worked for the Taliban nor did he ever provide assistance to the Taliban. He and his family left Syria because of the way people acted and liked the way the Afghanistan people were more religious.
- b. The detainee stated that he was never required to join the Taliban and that he never joined the Taliban.
 - c. The detainee stated he was never approached by al Qaida and was never part of al Qaida.
 - d. The detainee stated he has never supported or been affiliated with the Mujahedin.
- e. The detainee was described as a simple man trying to migrate to Afghanistan with his family.
- 5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

DMO Exhbit 1 Page 2 of 2

Department of Defense Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

14 May 2007

TO:

MJU'AYN-AL-DIN JAMAL-AL-DIN ABD-AL-SATTAR

SUBJECT:

UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF MJU'AYN-AL-DIN JAMAL-AL-DIN ABD-AL-SATTAR

- 1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
- 2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
- 3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
 - a. Commitment
- 1. In the summer of 2001, the detainee flew from Jeddha, Saudi Arabia, to Karachi, Pakistan.
- 2. The detainee paid for his ticket from his salary from the private holy Koran school in Mecca, Saudi Arabia.
- 3. An individual told the detainee he should go to Afghanistan to preach. The detainee believed if he traveled to Afghanistan, he would get credit from God.
- 4. An individual suggested that the detainee should accompany him to Afghanistan to teach the Koran. They traveled from Karachi, Pakistan via Quetta, Pakistan, to Kandahar, Afghanistan, and then to Kabul, Afghanistan.
 - 5. The detainee stated he went to Afghanistan to participate in a dawa.
 - b. Training
- 1. The detainee was identified as a trainer at al Farouq training camp in Afghanistan. He was trying to become a Kuwadir, a more specialized trainer.

DMO Exhibit 1
Page 1 of 3

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF MJU'AYN-AL-DIN JAMAL-AL-DIN ABD-AL-SATTAR

- 2. A source reported the detainee completed approximately one month of training at ai Farouq in Afghanistan. The detainee completed all the standard training modules with the exception of the explosive and rocket propelled grenade modules.
 - 3. The detainee was shown how to use a Kalashnikov rifle.
 - c. Connections/Associations
- 1. The detainee was taken to a valley where he was introduced to an individual who gave him a rifle.
 - 2. The individual who gave the detainee a rifle was in charge of al Qaida fighters.
- 3. A source reported the detainee collected money for Usama bin Laden when the detainee lived in Saudi Arabia. The source observed the detainee sitting near Usama bin Laden on more than one occasion when Usama bin Laden visited al Farouq training camp in Afghanistan.
- 4. A source believed the detainee was educated by a Sheikh at the Islamic university in Medina, Saudi Arabia.
 - 5. A source reported the Sheikh mentioned above had close ties with Usama bin Laden.

d. Intent

- 1. The detainee was a fighter in Tora Bora, Afghanistan, who moved around encouraging people to fight and be religious.
- 2. A source reported the detainee would frequently give religious speeches and encouragement to both the students at al Farouq and the fighters at Tora Bora, Afghanistan. The detainee's speeches were meant as encouragement for the various fighters aligned with the Taliban and al Qaida.
- 3. A source reported the detainee tells fellow detainees to not cooperate and encourages them to cause disturbances at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.
- 4. The detainee preaches about wanting to kill all Americans, including men, women, children, and bables.
 - e. Other Relevant Data
- 1. The detainee was captured with 2,000 Afghanistan dinars, 1,000 United States dollars and 1,000 Saudi Arabian riyals.

DMO Exibit 1 Page 2 of 3

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF MJU'AYN-AL-DIN JAMAL-AL-DIN ABD-AL-SATTAR

- 2. The detainee was captured with a Kalashnikov rifle.
- 3. The detainee was in Towr Khom, Afghanistan, for one month and then moved to Tora Bora, Afghanistan. He camped in Towr Khom because he had orders to stay there. Usama bin Laden visited Towr Khom for one or two days.
- 4. When the detainee went to Tora Bora, Afghanistan, he was in the Abdul Qadus al Bahraini camp, which was later taken over by Ibn Sheikh al Libi.
- 4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
 - a. The detainee stated he had never heard of or had knowledge of al Qaida.
- b. The detained denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on 11 September 2001, and also denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or United States interests.
- 5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

DMO Exibit 1 Page 3 of 3

Department of Defense Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

15 May 2007

TO:

ISMAIL SAID ALI BIN NASR

SUBJECT:

UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ISMAIL SAIID ALI BIN NASR

- 1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
- 2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
- 3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

- 1. The detainee decided while in Canada he wanted to go to Afghanistan because he believed the Taliban had created the only country which was truly Islamic, and the detainee wanted to live somewhere with only Sharia Law.
- 2. The detainee stated he traveled to Afghanistan with approximately 5,000 to 6,000 Canadian Dollars.
- 3. In October to November 2000 the detainee flew from Montreal, Canada, to London, England, and then to Tehran, Iran. From Tehran, the detainee traveled by taxi to the Iran-Afghanistan border and to Kabul, Afghanistan. The detainee presented his fraudulent passport to the Iranian border guards and purported to be a French Muslim traveling to Afghanistan for personal reasons.
- 4. The detainee stated he traveled to the guest house in Kabul, Afghanistan, and stayed there for approximately three months. The majority of boarders in the house were Taliban fighters awaiting training or resting after returning from the front lines.
- 5. The detainee stated he stayed for two weeks at an Arab guest house located in the same neighborhood as the Taliban intelligence headquarters.

DMO Exhibit 1 Page 1 of 3

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ISMAIL SAID ALI BIN NASR

6. The detainee stated he traveled to the Tora Bora mountains of Afghanistan after the fall of Kabul, Afghanistan, and dug shelters in the ground. The United States bombing was mostly on the other side of the mountains where Taliban fighters were fleeing the front lines.

b. Training

- 1. A source stated he met the detainee at the al Farouq Training Camp in Afghanistan.
- 2. The all Farouq Training Camp was funded by all Qaida and all students received weapons training, attended a commando course, and received instruction in topography and explosives.

c. Other Relevant Data

- 1. The detained stated he purchased a stolen passport and an altered driver's license. In 1995, he was detained in Canada by authorities for using the fake passport. Additionally, the detained stated he purchased a stolen passport in 2000 and received money from a person he met at a mosque for travel to Kabul, Afghanistan.
- 2. The detainee was captured with 740 British pounds, 429,000 Afghani, 2,300 Pakistani rupees, and a calculator.
- 4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
- a. The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on 11 September 2001 and also denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or United States interests.
 - b. The detainee stated he was not thinking of jihad when he moved to Afghanistan.
- c. The detainee denied ever having participated in any fighting or terrorist activity and denied he had any intention of participating in such activity if he is released. The detainee denied any knowledge of any future planned terrorist attacks in the United States and denied knowledge of the locations of any terrorist training camps or the identity of any individuals affiliated with al Qaida or other terrorist organizations.
 - d. The detainee stated he is not a member of al Qaida.
- 5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against

DMO Exhibit 1 Page 2 of 3

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ISMAILL SAILD ALI BIN NASR continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

DMO Exhibit 1 Page 3 of 3

Department of Defense Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

14 March 2007

TO:

SAIID, FARHI

SUBJECT:

UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE

REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF FARHI SAIID

- 1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
- 2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
- 3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

- 1. The detainee is a suspected member of al Qaida who participated in action against coalition forces in Afghanistan. The detainee reportedly attended training at al Qaida's Derunta and al Farouq Training Camps in Afghanistan.
- 2. The detainee stated he entered Italy illegally in 1997. While in Italy, the detainee purchased a French passport from Algerian robbers.
- 3. The detainee stated he used the French passport purchased from the Algerian robbers to travel to England on 7 January 2001. After arriving in England the detainee had an individual fraudulently attach his photograph to the passport.
- 4. Approximately two weeks after the detainee arrived in England, the detainee met a Moroccan at a mosque. The Moroccan facilitated the detainee's travel to Pakistan by obtaining a fraudulent visa and paying for the detainee's airplane ticket from England, to Islamabad, Pakistan. The detainee traveled to Pakistan on 2 June 2001 and met an individual arranged by the Moroccan. That individual arranged for the detainee to be driven into the mountains of Pakistan and then continue on foot crossing the border into Afghanistan without showing any papers. Once in Afghanistan, the detainee continued on to an Algerian guest house.
- 5. A source identified the detainee as someone he saw at the Algerian safe house in Jalalabad, Afghanistan in August 2001.

DMO Exhibit 1 Page 1 of 3

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF FARHI SAIID

6. The detainee was detained by Pakistani authorities in December 2001 with a group of 13 others while crossing into Pakistan. Several individuals in the group were confessed members of al Qaida while others admitted to fighting on behalf of the Taliban. The detainee stated he received weapons training at the front in Bagram, Afghanistan and spent some time in an Algerian guest house in Jalalabad, Afghanistan.

b. Training

- 1. The detainee stated he was conscripted into the Algerian Army in 1981. The detainee served with a construction service unit assigned to military bases. The detainee's specialty was construction. The detainee also received two months of basic training with the Kalashnikov and Seminov rifles.
- 2. The detainee was identified as having trained at the Algerian training camp located near Kabul, Afghanistan.
 - c. Connections/Associations
 - 1. The detainee stated he frequented the Finsbury Park mosque in London, England.
- 2. The Finsbury Park Mosque in London, England was linked with a gathering of Islamic fundamentalists organized by an Islamic extremist group. A number of senior Muslim leaders gave presentations praising Usama bin Laden and justifying the 11 September 2001 attacks on the United States.
- 3. The detainee stated that after attending the Finsbury Park Mosque he began attending the Baker Street Mosque in London, England on a regular basis.
- 4. The Baker Street prayer group in London, England was run by a Palestinian cleric named by the United Nations as a terrorist suspect whose assets were frozen.
- 5. The detainee stated he saw Usama bin Laden shortly after 11 September 2001 while living in Kabul, Afghanistan. Usama bin Laden was attending a funeral in a cemetery on the outskirts of Kabul. The detainee and a friend happened to be passing by on the street and stopped to attend the funeral.
- 4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
- a. The detainee stated his sole reason for traveling to Afghanistan was to meet a Swedish woman.

DMO Exhibit 1 Page 2 of 3

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF FARHI SAIID

- b. The detained denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on 11 September 2001, and also denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or United States interests.
- c. The detainee stated he never heard of al Qaida until after 11 September 2001. The detainee described al Qaida as a platform or foundation. The detainee stated he did not carry any weapons while in Afghanistan and that he is against fighting.
- d. The detainee stated he was a peaceful person and wants to live a good life. The detainee wants to marry, have children, get a job and live in Europe.
- e. The detainee stated he does not nor has he ever had any affiliation with al Qaida. The detainee did not know of the group's existence before he went to Afghanistan. The detainee stated he was never affiliated with any non-governmental organizations and does not know if any mosques he was affiliated with are involved with non-governmental organizations. The detainee stated he mostly went to the mosques looking for work and did not spend much time there.
- 5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

DMO Exhibit 1 Page 3 of 3

Department of Defense Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

21 June 2007

TO:

MUHAMMAD KHANTUMANI

SUBJECT:

UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF MUHAMMAD KHANTUMANI

- 1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
- 2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
- 3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

- 1. The detainee stated that in July 2001 his mother received a letter from her husband stating he wanted the family to join him in Afghanistan. The detainee and his family traveled from Syria to Afghanistan via Turkey and Iran. The detainee and his family stayed in Kabul, Afghanistan, for three months and then moved to Jalalabad, Afghanistan.
- 2. The detainee stated his family was reunited with the detainee's father at the border of Afghanistan and Iran.
 - 3. The detainee and his family stayed for one month in Jalalabad, Afghanistan.
- 4. The detainee and his family traveled from Jalalabad, Afghanistan, to the Tora Bora region in Afghanistan, where the family eventually split up.
- 5. The detainee stated that when the situation escalated in Jalalabad, Afghanistan, his father suggested trying to make it to the Pakistani border. The detainee and his father traveled for 12 days through the mountains of Afghanistan and arrived at the Parachinar border. On the third day the detainee and his father were handed over to the Pakistani police.

DMO Exhibit _1 Page 1 of 2

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF MUHAMMAD KHANTUMANI

b. Training

A source gave a physical description of the detainee, who the source met at the al Farouq training camp in Afghanistan in 2001.

c. Connections/Associations

- 1. According to an undated letter, the detainee is listed as a probable al Qaida member who was incarcerated in Pakistan.
- 2. Several senior al Qaida members and captured terrorist-affiliated items have positively identified the detainee as an associate of al Qaida.

d. Other Relevant Data

The detainee stated he hates Americans because of the detainee's treatment by Americans in Cuba and the alleged killing of the detainee's family by Americans in Afghanistan.

- 4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
- a. The detainee stated he did not go to Afghanistan to fight in the jihad, but simply to visit his father who was the owner of a restaurant in Kabul, Afghanistan.
- b. The detainee stated he had no specific knowledge of the Taliban or al Qaida organizations. The detainee also claimed not to have been a combatant in Afghanistan.
- c. The detainee has stated that he has no problems with the United States or any Arab government.
- d. The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on 11 September 2001. The detainee also denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or United States interests.
- 5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

DMO Exhibit _1 Page 2 of 2

Department of Defense Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

24 May 2007

TO:

MOMMUR EDAWI DUKHAN

SUBJECT:

UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF MOMMUR EDAWI DUKHAN

- 1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
- 2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
- 3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
 - a. Commitment
- 1. The detainee became sympathetic to the Afghanistan plight through images posted in his mosque in Saudi Arabia. The detainee journeyed to Afghanistan via Pakistan for jihad despite his fear of the Saudi government's monitoring and laws against it.
 - 2. The detainee stated he fought in Afghanistan and was a leader in charge of soldiers.
- 3. The detainee served as a rear echelon guard and manned an observation post in Bagram, Afghanistan.
- 4. The detainee left Bagram, Afghanistan and traveled to Kabul, Afghanistan. The detainee and two others traveled from Kabul to Jalalabad, Afghanistan and then followed other Arabs into the hills before deciding to turn themselves in.
 - b. Connections/Associations
- 1. The detainee's name was on a list of incarcerated associates used by suspected al Qaida members in Pakistan in early 2002.
- 2. The detainee's name was on a list of captured Mujahedin associated with a high-ranking al Qaida operative.

DMO Exhibit 1 Page 1 of 3

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF MOMMUR EDAWI DUKHAN

- 3. The detainee's name was on a document listing the names of Muslims fighting with the Taliban against the Northern Alliance.
- 4. The detainee's name was on a document listing Arabic names recovered from safe house raids associated with suspected al Qaida in Pakistan.
- 5. The detainee stated he met Usama bin Laden and shook his hand in a way that demonstrated love. The detainee stated he loves Usama bin Laden because he fights Americans.
 - c. Other Relevant Data
- 1. In September 2005 the detainee was informed he has been associated with the deaths of six Pakistani Police Officers who died when detainees fought and overturned a bus in late 2001 or early 2002 near the Afghan and Pakistan border. The detainee stated he was not involved in the incident.
- 2. The detainee stated while in the desert, he figured out how to make Predator drones and cruise missiles miss their targets. By slightly adjusting his position after the Predator drones had passed, the detainee made cruise missiles miss his tent. The detainee then stated he was never in Afghanistan.
- 3. The detainee stated he hated and wanted to kill Americans. The detainee stated that his hatred is so deep that if he were released, he would fight against Americans anywhere in the world. The detainee also stated that the Koran specifically says to kill Americans and non-Muslims.
- 4. The detainee stated he is a fighter and brother to Usama bin Laden. The detainee stated that anyone who hates Americans is the detainee's brother.
- 5. The detainee stated that a big fight was coming that will bring fire and destruction, and no one will receive any mercy from God. The detainee further stated there can never be peace between Muslims and Americans.
- 4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
- a. The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on September 11th, and also denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or United States interests.
 - b. The detainee stated he does not know anything about al Qaida.

DMO Exhibit 1 Page 2 of 3

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF MOMMUR EDAWI DUKHAN

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

DMO Exhibit 1 Page 3 of 3

Department of Defense Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

31 January 2007

TO:

KUMAN, AHMED JYASLAM SAIJ ID

SUBJECT:

UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF SAID KUMAN, AHMED JYASLAM SAIJ ID

- 1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
- 2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
- 3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
 - a. Commitment
- 1. The detainee claimed to have originally left Saudi Arabia for Yemen, on account of being wanted in conjunction with a narcotics case.
- 2. The detainee stated after hearing fatwas from a Saudi Arabian sheikh, he decided to go to Afghanistan.
- 3. A source stated one of the Sandi Arabian sheikhs who issued the fatwas encouraged people to fight jihad against Christians and Jews. The sheikh condoned the 11 September 2001 attacks against the United States and helped raise money for Usama bin Laden.
 - 4. The detainee stated he left home with the intention of dying in jihad.
- 5. The detainee stated an individual helped him obtain the Pakistani visa which facilitated his travel to Afghanistan.
- 6. The detainee stated an individual provided him the address for the Taliban building in Quetta, Pakistan. When the detainee arrived at the Taliban office, he told them he wanted to go to Afghanistan to fight.
- 7. The detainee traveled by plane to Kabul, Afghanistan and proceeded to the Taliban Center in downtown Kabul, Afghanistan.

DMO Exhibit 1 Page 1 of 4

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF SAID KUMAN, AHMED JYASLAM SAIJ ID

- 8. The detainee asked to go to the fighting at the front lines.
- 9. The detainee was identified by a source as suspected al Qaida and was seen at the Khana Gulam Bacha Guest House on the Taliban front lines in Kabul, Afghanistan during late 1999 to early 2000.
- 10. The detainee stated he was sent to guard the airport in a bunker, where he remained for three months. The detainee also stated that when the American planes started bombing he traveled to Jalalabad, Afghanistan.
- 11. The detainee was identified as the bus driver for the Haj Habash Safe House in Kandahar, Afghanistan in April 2001.
- 12. After the 11 September 2001 attacks in the United States the detainee was seen in Tora Bora, Afghanistan, where he was a fighter and had the following weapons with him; a Kalashnikov rifle, a PK machine gun and a rocket propelled grenade.
- 13. The detainee stated he fought with the Taliban forces in Bagram, Afghanistan and Tora Bora, Afghanistan.
- 14. An individual that served with the detainee on the front lines stated he believed the detainee was a bodyguard for Usama bin Laden.
- 15. The detainee was captured by Pakistani forces as part of a group of 84 Mujahedin fighters who crossed the border from the Nangarhar province of Afghanistan into Pakistan after 11 September 2001.
- 16. The detainee's name appeared on computer media seized on 11 September 2002 in a raid on an alleged al Qaida safe house in Karachi, Pakistan.
- 17. The detainee's name appears on a list of al Qaida Mujahedin and the contents of his trust account was found on a computer hard drive recovered during raids against al Qaida associated safe houses on 1 March 2003 in Rawalpindi, Pakistan.
- 18. The hard drive recovered during the raid was associated with a senior al Qaida operative.

b. Training

1. The detainee stated he was directed to a Taliban center outside of Kandahar, Afghanistan, where he received one and half weeks of training.

Page 2 of 4

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF SAID KUMAN, AHMED JYASLAM SAIJ ID

- 2. The detainee stated he trained on the AK-47 and PK machine gun in a camp in Kandahar, Afghanistan.
- 3. The detained trained at the al Farouq Training Camp then participated in advanced commando training in Kandahar, Afghanistan. Commando training consisted of rappelling and instruction in the area of kidnapping, assassinations, poisons and explosives.
 - c. Connections/Associations
- 1. The detained stated he was personal friends with Usama bin Laden's son, and that Usama bin Laden treated the detained like one of his own sons.
 - 2. The detainee stated Usama bin Laden was like a father to him.
- 3. The detainee stated he had access to Usama bin Laden at anytime because of this relationship.
 - d. Intent
- I. The detainee stated that God had already assured victory for Mujahedin around the world and that there was no way to prevent it.
- 2. The detainee has made statements expressing his desire to continue jihad against the United States.
 - e. Other Relevant Data
 - 1. The detainee was in possession of a Casio model F-91W watch at the time of capture.
- 2. The Casio model F-91W watch has been used in bombings that have been linked to al Qaida and radical Islamic terrorists improvised explosive devices.
- 4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
- a. The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to 11 September 2001.
- b. The detainee denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or United States interests.
- c. The detainee stated he knows of no information about al Qaida and claims he did not fight against the United States.

Page 3 of 4

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF SAID KUMAN, AHMED JYASLAM SAIJ ID

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

Page 4 of 4

Department of Defense Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

12 June 2007

TO:

AHMED ADNAN AHIM

SUBJECT:

UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE

REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AHMED ADNAN AHIM

- 1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
- 2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
- 3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
 - a. Commitment
 - 1. The detainee claimed he read about the Taliban state and wanted to see it for himself.
- 2. The detainee flew from Damascus, Syria, to Tehran, Iran, and then to Zahedan, Iran. From there the detainee traveled by taxi into Kandahar, Afghanistan.
- 3. The detained stated he traveled to Afghanistan to witness how the Taliban applied Islamic law.
 - 4. The detainee stayed at a legal college in Afghanistan owned by Usama bin Laden.
- 5. The detained stated he worked for the al Wafa organization. The al Wafa office was located in the Wazir Akbar Khan neighborhood.
 - 6. The Wazir Akhbar Khan District is controlled and inhabited by al Qaida personnel.
- 7. A source stated al Wafa was part of Usama bin Laden's organization and that it laundered money and provided Arab and Pakistani fighters on the battlefield with medical care and clothing.

DMO Exhibit 1 Page 1 of 3